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Values in Science: The Distinction ...

Aufrecht, Monica G.

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Values in Science: The Distinction between the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Values in Science: The Distinction between the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification./
作者:	Aufrecht, Monica G.
面頁冊數:	174 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-12, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International71-12A.
標題:	Philosophy of Science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3431521
ISBN:	9781124314273

Values in Science: The Distinction between the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification.
Aufrecht, Monica G.

Values in Science: The Distinction between the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification. - 174 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-12, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2010.

Hans Reichenbach coined the distinction between "the context of discovery" and "the context of justification" in 1938 to distinguish the actual development of scientific theories from their rational reconstructions. My dissertation explores the role of this "context distinction" in analytic philosophy of science. I show how ambiguous uses of the distinction have masked underlying disagreements about discovery, evidence, justification, observation, and objectivity.

ISBN: 9781124314273Subjects--Topical Terms:

894954
Philosophy of Science.

Values in Science: The Distinction between the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification.
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245 1 0 $a Values in Science: The Distinction between the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-12, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Adviser: Arthur Fine.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2010.
520 $a Hans Reichenbach coined the distinction between "the context of discovery" and "the context of justification" in 1938 to distinguish the actual development of scientific theories from their rational reconstructions. My dissertation explores the role of this "context distinction" in analytic philosophy of science. I show how ambiguous uses of the distinction have masked underlying disagreements about discovery, evidence, justification, observation, and objectivity.
520 $a The context distinction initially played a major role in shaping the goals of philosophy of science. For example, it was often contended that the historian may ask what life experiences led Einstein to Relativity, but the philosopher examines only the theory itself, with the aim of determining whether it is justified. However, after Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962, critics challenged the context distinction. In addition, as Paul Hoyningen-Huene notes, many distinctions are in use: between the fields of history and philosophy; creativity and logic; and historical contingencies and timeless scientific facts.
520 $a In this project I argue for four claims. First, we should not search for a single best version of the context distinction. Hoyningen-Huene suggests there is a core distinction between descriptive and normative perspectives. However, I show how Reichenbach's original distinction is actually between two descriptions: the thinking processes of scientists versus their "cleaned-up" arguments for public presentation. Secondly, I argue that we should approach the many versions of the context distinctions as tools and we should evaluate them by their usefulness for any given aim. Thirdly, many versions of the context distinction are independent of each another. For instance, Kuhn has been charged with rejecting the context distinction in general, but I show how he accepts some versions of it (e.g., thought processes vs. justification, Is vs. Ought), while rejecting others (e.g., values vs. logic, history vs. philosophy). Thus, one can use some versions without being committed to others. Finally, these ambiguities often mask underlying disagreements. Clarifying these ambiguities does not resolve debates; however, it does allow stalled-out debates to continue in more fruitful directions.
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