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Agency theory and executive pay = th...

Pepper, Alexander.

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Agency theory and executive pay = the remuneration committee's dilemma /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Agency theory and executive pay/ by Alexander Pepper.
其他題名:	the remuneration committee's dilemma /
作者:	Pepper, Alexander.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2019.,
面頁冊數:	xi, 133 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	1. Agency Costs, Coordination Problems and the Remuneration Committee's Dilemma -- 2. What's Wrong with Agency Theory? -- 3. What a Public Corporation Really Is -- 4. Executive Pay as a Collective Action Problem -- 5. Behavioural Agency Theory -- 6. The Modern Corporation's Final Chapter.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Executives - Salaries, etc. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99969-2
ISBN:	9783319999692

Agency theory and executive pay = the remuneration committee's dilemma /
Pepper, Alexander.

Agency theory and executive paythe remuneration committee's dilemma /[electronic resource] :by Alexander Pepper. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2019. - xi, 133 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

1. Agency Costs, Coordination Problems and the Remuneration Committee's Dilemma -- 2. What's Wrong with Agency Theory? -- 3. What a Public Corporation Really Is -- 4. Executive Pay as a Collective Action Problem -- 5. Behavioural Agency Theory -- 6. The Modern Corporation's Final Chapter.

This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioural science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.

ISBN: 9783319999692

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-99969-2doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

779360
Executives
--Salaries, etc.

LC Class. No.: HD4965.2 / .P477 2019

Dewey Class. No.: 658.4072

Agency theory and executive pay = the remuneration committee's dilemma /
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