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Political power and corporate contro...

Gourevitch, Peter Alexis.

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Political power and corporate control = the new global politics of corporate governance /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Political power and corporate control/ Peter Alexis Gourevitch and James J. Shinn.
其他題名:	the new global politics of corporate governance /
其他題名:	Political power & corporate control
作者:	Gourevitch, Peter Alexis.
其他作者:	Shinn, James.
出版者:	Princeton :Princeton University Press, : 2007.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xvii, 344 p.) :ill.
附註:	Includes statistical evidence from a sample of 39 countries, with detailed narratives of nine specific country cases.
內容註:	Introduction and summary argument -- Governance patterns: what causes what? -- Framing incentives: the economics and law tradition -- Politics: preferences and institutions -- Preference cleavages 1: class conflict -- Preference cleavages 2: sectoral conflict -- Preference cleavages 3: transparency, voice, and pensions -- Conclusion : going forward.
標題:	Corporate governance. -
電子資源:	http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt7rq3q
ISBN:	9781400837014 (electronic bk.)

Political power and corporate control = the new global politics of corporate governance /
Gourevitch, Peter Alexis.

Political power and corporate controlthe new global politics of corporate governance /[electronic resource] :Political power & corporate controlPeter Alexis Gourevitch and James J. Shinn. - Princeton :Princeton University Press,2007. - 1 online resource (xvii, 344 p.) :ill.

Includes statistical evidence from a sample of 39 countries, with detailed narratives of nine specific country cases.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 313-332) and index.

Introduction and summary argument -- Governance patterns: what causes what? -- Framing incentives: the economics and law tradition -- Politics: preferences and institutions -- Preference cleavages 1: class conflict -- Preference cleavages 2: sectoral conflict -- Preference cleavages 3: transparency, voice, and pensions -- Conclusion : going forward.

"Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance."--Publisher's description.

ISBN: 9781400837014 (electronic bk.)Subjects--Topical Terms:

549410
Corporate governance.

LC Class. No.: HD2741 / .G677 2010

Dewey Class. No.: 338.6+

Political power and corporate control = the new global politics of corporate governance /
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245 1 0 $a Political power and corporate control $h [electronic resource] : $b the new global politics of corporate governance / $c Peter Alexis Gourevitch and James J. Shinn.
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246 3 0 $a Global politics of corporate governance
260 $a Princeton : $b Princeton University Press, $c 2007.
300 $a 1 online resource (xvii, 344 p.) : $b ill.
500 $a Includes statistical evidence from a sample of 39 countries, with detailed narratives of nine specific country cases.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references (p. 313-332) and index.
505 0 $a Introduction and summary argument -- Governance patterns: what causes what? -- Framing incentives: the economics and law tradition -- Politics: preferences and institutions -- Preference cleavages 1: class conflict -- Preference cleavages 2: sectoral conflict -- Preference cleavages 3: transparency, voice, and pensions -- Conclusion : going forward.
520 $a "Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance."--Publisher's description.
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650 0 $a Corporate governance. $3 549410
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650 0 $a Business and politics. $3 734357
650 0 $a Corporations $x Political activity. $3 922221
650 0 $a International finance. $3 588383
700 1 $a Shinn, James. $3 2089926
856 4 0 $u http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt7rq3q