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The economics of apologies: Theory,...

Ho, Benjamin.

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The economics of apologies: Theory, experiment, and application.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The economics of apologies: Theory, experiment, and application./
作者:	Ho, Benjamin.
面頁冊數:	101 p.
附註:	Adviser: Edward Lazear.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-05A.
標題:	Economics, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3219288
ISBN:	9780542706899

The economics of apologies: Theory, experiment, and application.
Ho, Benjamin.

The economics of apologies: Theory, experiment, and application. - 101 p.

Adviser: Edward Lazear.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2006.

Apologies are a previously understudied social institution integral in the maintenance of social relationships. Their application ranges from corporate culture to political systems to legal settings. This paper formulates a game theoretic signaling model using rational agents with two-dimensional type that is general enough to encompass a broad class of games where apologies can be used. I characterize the equilibrium and establish an existence result that extends single-crossing. The theory is then tested using a novel variant of the trust game experiment confirming all predictions. I use these findings to assess the use of apologies in medical malpractice litigation and estimate that state legislation that exempts apologies from being entered as evidence in court reduces the number of medical malpractice cases by 43%.

ISBN: 9780542706899Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

The economics of apologies: Theory, experiment, and application.
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520 $a Apologies are a previously understudied social institution integral in the maintenance of social relationships. Their application ranges from corporate culture to political systems to legal settings. This paper formulates a game theoretic signaling model using rational agents with two-dimensional type that is general enough to encompass a broad class of games where apologies can be used. I characterize the equilibrium and establish an existence result that extends single-crossing. The theory is then tested using a novel variant of the trust game experiment confirming all predictions. I use these findings to assess the use of apologies in medical malpractice litigation and estimate that state legislation that exempts apologies from being entered as evidence in court reduces the number of medical malpractice cases by 43%.
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