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Hegel, Kierkegaard, and the limits o...

Hejduk, Matthew Dickerson.

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Hegel, Kierkegaard, and the limits of rationality.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Hegel, Kierkegaard, and the limits of rationality./
Author:	Hejduk, Matthew Dickerson.
Description:	475 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Dennis L. Sepper.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-05A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3216934
ISBN:	9780542678721

Hegel, Kierkegaard, and the limits of rationality.
Hejduk, Matthew Dickerson.

Hegel, Kierkegaard, and the limits of rationality. - 475 p.

Adviser: Dennis L. Sepper.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Dallas, 2006.

Hegelians, who embrace a dialectical rational model capable of accounting for the whole of reality, and Kierkegaardians, who argue that so comprehensive a rationalist accounting is not possible, generally ascribe their divergences to a difference in presuppositions. The present study examines these presuppositions in order to determine the feasibility of a rationalist system that can subsume all aspects of reality. It concludes that there are regions of reality, such as the God-man relationship and aspects of human psychology, that strongly resist a rationalist accounting; and rationalist systems therefore need to retreat from ultimate claims of universality.

ISBN: 9780542678721Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Hegel, Kierkegaard, and the limits of rationality.
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005 20110927
008 110927s2006 eng d
020 $a 9780542678721
035 $a (UMI)AAI3216934
035 $a AAI3216934
040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Hejduk, Matthew Dickerson. $3 1296424
245 1 0 $a Hegel, Kierkegaard, and the limits of rationality.
300 $a 475 p.
500 $a Adviser: Dennis L. Sepper.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1758.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Dallas, 2006.
520 $a Hegelians, who embrace a dialectical rational model capable of accounting for the whole of reality, and Kierkegaardians, who argue that so comprehensive a rationalist accounting is not possible, generally ascribe their divergences to a difference in presuppositions. The present study examines these presuppositions in order to determine the feasibility of a rationalist system that can subsume all aspects of reality. It concludes that there are regions of reality, such as the God-man relationship and aspects of human psychology, that strongly resist a rationalist accounting; and rationalist systems therefore need to retreat from ultimate claims of universality.
520 $a The study's first section examines the cogency of Hegelian dialectic. It finds the typical criticisms of Hegel to be unfounded; he can resist charges of determinism and aprioricity, and his proposed dialectical method is reasonable and internally consistent. However, dialectic's application to reality, as attempted in his Encyclopaedia, is not, as the dialectic takes on an excessive elasticity that prevents it from being considered a true methodology. This methodological failure strips Hegelian dialectic of any metaphysical status and therefore of any coherence-based claims to universality.
520 $a With Hegelian universality in question, the study's second section turns to Kierkegaard. After adjudicating the issues associated with his pseudonymous and religious authorship, his commentary on two rationalist religious issues---the problem of unjust suffering and the relationship between ethics and revelation---is investigated in considerable detail through an examination of his exegesis of the book of Job and the Sacrifice of Isaac. It is determined that no persuasive rationalist-compatible exegesis or interpretation of these theologically important works is possible, leading to the conclusion that the God-man relationship represents a boundary for rationalism.
520 $a The study's third section points a way to an epistemology that can include such non-rational elements without sinking into irrationality. Drawing on recent neurobiological research, it proposes a much broader role for emotive elements in "rational" cognition than has been generally supposed. Such elements, enabled by anticipatory mood, can engender decisions that differ from the results yielded by disinterested formal logic yet are still repeatable, explicable, and ultimately satisfactory.
590 $a School code: 0150.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Religion, Biblical Studies. $3 1020189
650 4 $a Religion, Philosophy of. $3 1017774
690 $a 0321
690 $a 0322
690 $a 0422
710 2 0 $a University of Dallas. $3 1295614
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 67-05A.
790 $a 0150
790 1 0 $a Sepper, Dennis L., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2006
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3216934