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Alliance incentives in the online co...

Oh, Christopher Jungsuk.

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Alliance incentives in the online content market.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Alliance incentives in the online content market./
Author:	Oh, Christopher Jungsuk.
Description:	133 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Samuel Chiu.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-03A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3085338

Alliance incentives in the online content market.
Oh, Christopher Jungsuk.

Alliance incentives in the online content market. - 133 p.

Adviser: Samuel Chiu.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2003.

This dissertation explores the role of profit-sharing in forming alliances among key players in the online content market. The profit-sharing model driven by flexible billing management systems has been one of the major facilitating factors for the recent development of the online content market through which various industry players have taken advantage of the synergy effect with potential partners. However, the actual settlement of the profit-sharing rule is often marred by the dispute over the share of the total profit for each potential alliance member. The “core” and the “Shapley value” concepts from the cooperative game literature can help resolve this potential dispute.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Alliance incentives in the online content market.
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008 110505s2003 eng d
035 $a (UnM)AAI3085338
035 $a AAI3085338
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Oh, Christopher Jungsuk. $3 1257087
245 1 0 $a Alliance incentives in the online content market.
300 $a 133 p.
500 $a Adviser: Samuel Chiu.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-03, Section: A, page: 1005.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2003.
520 $a This dissertation explores the role of profit-sharing in forming alliances among key players in the online content market. The profit-sharing model driven by flexible billing management systems has been one of the major facilitating factors for the recent development of the online content market through which various industry players have taken advantage of the synergy effect with potential partners. However, the actual settlement of the profit-sharing rule is often marred by the dispute over the share of the total profit for each potential alliance member. The “core” and the “Shapley value” concepts from the cooperative game literature can help resolve this potential dispute.
520 $a The online content market in this dissertation is portrayed as a two-layered industry consisting of the content and the network service industry in which the NP (Network Provider) interacts with the CP (Content Provider) in a way that the content demand is significantly affected by the QoS (Quality of Service) of the delivery network. Using a two-stage, quality-price game, players are assumed to either ally or not on the LR (long run) quality investments and the SR (short run) price decisions. The partial alliance case in which players cooperate only on the LR investment is given a special attention.
520 $a In Chapter 2, a single content environment is presented in which the CP and the NP charge either a usage-based or fixed fee. Effectiveness of each pricing environment is compared with one another in terms of various criteria. In Chapter 3, a partial vertical alliance model is presented in which a side payment might be required to reach a successful alliance. With an additional CP introduced in Chapter 4, the effectiveness of the two-player alliance can be undermined by the reaction of the non-allying player. Chapter 5 presents an environment in which free and premium content coexist. The use of a side payment can lead to higher joint profit between the premium CP and the NP even without an explicit alliance arrangement. Also, the amount of the side payment that will place both players into the core always exists.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Engineering, System Science. $3 1018128
650 4 $a Information Science. $3 1017528
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710 2 0 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-03A.
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790 1 0 $a Chiu, Samuel, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3085338