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Why do IPO underwriters allocate ext...

Zhang, Donghang.

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Why do IPO underwriters allocate extra shares when they expect to buy them back?

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Why do IPO underwriters allocate extra shares when they expect to buy them back?/
Author:	Zhang, Donghang.
Description:	58 p.
Notes:	Chair: Jay R. Ritter.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-06A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Banking. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3056798
ISBN:	0493720979

Why do IPO underwriters allocate extra shares when they expect to buy them back?
Zhang, Donghang.

Why do IPO underwriters allocate extra shares when they expect to buy them back? - 58 p.

Chair: Jay R. Ritter.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2002.

For initial public offerings (IPOs) where the road show suggests weak demand, underwriters usually oversell the issue and take a short position beyond what can be covered by the overallotment option. The purpose of this dissertation is to rationalize this feature of underwriters taking a naked (unhedged) short position in weak IPOs. We hypothesize that overselling is used by underwriters as a marketing strategy, and an IPO's aftermarket price depends on the allocation of shares to investors in the offering. Under this path-dependency hypothesis, we show that, when demand is weak, it may be optimal for the underwriter to oversell an issue and take a naked short position. The issuing firm benefits from a higher expected offer price. This is in spite of the fact that, in equilibrium, allocating more shares when demand is weak requires greater underpricing when demand is strong. Our model also predicts that the underwriter will concentrate underpricing in the states where demand is very strong, generating an extremely skewed distribution of first-day returns.

ISBN: 0493720979Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018458
Business Administration, Banking.

Why do IPO underwriters allocate extra shares when they expect to buy them back?
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2002.
520 $a For initial public offerings (IPOs) where the road show suggests weak demand, underwriters usually oversell the issue and take a short position beyond what can be covered by the overallotment option. The purpose of this dissertation is to rationalize this feature of underwriters taking a naked (unhedged) short position in weak IPOs. We hypothesize that overselling is used by underwriters as a marketing strategy, and an IPO's aftermarket price depends on the allocation of shares to investors in the offering. Under this path-dependency hypothesis, we show that, when demand is weak, it may be optimal for the underwriter to oversell an issue and take a naked short position. The issuing firm benefits from a higher expected offer price. This is in spite of the fact that, in equilibrium, allocating more shares when demand is weak requires greater underpricing when demand is strong. Our model also predicts that the underwriter will concentrate underpricing in the states where demand is very strong, generating an extremely skewed distribution of first-day returns.
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