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Collective action under the Articles...

Dougherty, Keith L.

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Collective action under the Articles of Confederation: The impact of institutional design on the provision of public goods.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Collective action under the Articles of Confederation: The impact of institutional design on the provision of public goods./
Author:	Dougherty, Keith L.
Description:	184 p.
Notes:	Chair: Joe A. Oppenheimer.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International58-06A.
Subject:	Economics, History. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9736552
ISBN:	0591465922

Collective action under the Articles of Confederation: The impact of institutional design on the provision of public goods.
Dougherty, Keith L.

Collective action under the Articles of Confederation: The impact of institutional design on the provision of public goods. - 184 p.

Chair: Joe A. Oppenheimer.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland College Park, 1997.

Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists presented sensible explanations for why the states did not pay their requisitions to the Continental Congress. Modern interpretations of the period reinforce their claims. But taking these theories seriously presents a puzzle. States paid more money to Congress than either theory predicts. States paid roughly 40% of their requisitions from 1782 to 1789. With compelling reasons for states to withhold their resources, why did they pay major portions of their requisitions during the confederation?

ISBN: 0591465922Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017418
Economics, History.

Collective action under the Articles of Confederation: The impact of institutional design on the provision of public goods.
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005 20110429
008 110429s1997 eng d
020 $a 0591465922
035 $a (UnM)AAI9736552
035 $a AAI9736552
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Dougherty, Keith L. $3 1255385
245 1 0 $a Collective action under the Articles of Confederation: The impact of institutional design on the provision of public goods.
300 $a 184 p.
500 $a Chair: Joe A. Oppenheimer.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-06, Section: A, page: 2371.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland College Park, 1997.
520 $a Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists presented sensible explanations for why the states did not pay their requisitions to the Continental Congress. Modern interpretations of the period reinforce their claims. But taking these theories seriously presents a puzzle. States paid more money to Congress than either theory predicts. States paid roughly 40% of their requisitions from 1782 to 1789. With compelling reasons for states to withhold their resources, why did they pay major portions of their requisitions during the confederation?
520 $a Requisitions were unenforced taxes upon the states for national goods and services--the official source of federal revenue under the Articles. This study suggests that states paid their requisitions to obtain private goods and to advance local interests. States made only partial payments because Congress also produced public goods that gave them reason to free-ride. Empirical evidence on the proximity of the Continental army and ownership of the public debt strongly support the private goods hypothesis. This confirms another claim made by the Federalists--that the states were "self-interested" in their behavior.
520 $a In developing this argument the present study addresses two additional questions. (1) Why did the framers choose to fund national, public goods through the system of requisitions? And (2) how did the Articles of Confederation affect state decisions to contribute toward public goods? Historical evidence suggests that the framers adopted the system of requisitions to preserve state sovereignty and to share common state burdens. But despite the goal of burden sharing, the Articles did not give the states incentive to contribute as intended. Deductive analysis suggests that states were no more likely to contribute under the Articles than they would be in an institution-free setting. This supports the Federalist claim about the failure of the constitutional design and its inability to induce payments.
590 $a School code: 0117.
650 4 $a Economics, History. $3 1017418
650 4 $a History, United States. $3 1017393
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
690 $a 0337
690 $a 0509
690 $a 0615
710 2 0 $a University of Maryland College Park. $3 1249734
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 58-06A.
790 $a 0117
790 1 0 $a Oppenheimer, Joe A., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1997
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9736552