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New perspectives on alternating-offe...

Mikami, Kazuhiko.

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New perspectives on alternating-offer bargaining.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	New perspectives on alternating-offer bargaining./
Author:	Mikami, Kazuhiko.
Description:	145 p.
Notes:	Major Professor: Robert W. Rosenthal.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International61-04A.
Subject:	Economics, Theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9967161
ISBN:	0599718137

New perspectives on alternating-offer bargaining.
Mikami, Kazuhiko.

New perspectives on alternating-offer bargaining. - 145 p.

Major Professor: Robert W. Rosenthal.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2001.

This dissertation studies alternating-offer bargaining models. It consists of three chapters: the first two concern bargaining over two goods (or issues) and the third concerns bargaining over one good when strategic complexity is assumed to matter.

ISBN: 0599718137Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

New perspectives on alternating-offer bargaining.
LDR:03034nam 2200301 a 45 001 929069
005 20110427
008 110427s2001 eng d
020 $a 0599718137
035 $a (UnM)AAI9967161
035 $a AAI9967161
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Mikami, Kazuhiko. $3 1252554
245 1 0 $a New perspectives on alternating-offer bargaining.
300 $a 145 p.
500 $a Major Professor: Robert W. Rosenthal.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-04, Section: A, page: 1546.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2001.
520 $a This dissertation studies alternating-offer bargaining models. It consists of three chapters: the first two concern bargaining over two goods (or issues) and the third concerns bargaining over one good when strategic complexity is assumed to matter.
520 $a In chapter 1, I study comparative statics of equilibria with respect to changes in the substitutability of commodities in two-good, alternating-offer bargaining. A negotiator may be concerned with balance between quantities of different goods, and this is represented by a measure of substitutability. It turns out that bargaining solutions are not monotonic in simple measures of substitutability. I show that for a general class of utility functions the direction of change in the equilibrium allocation is ambiguous, but that there is a class of utility functions for which the direction is pinned down. The familiar case of CES utility functions is also examined.
520 $a In chapter 2, I consider a two-good bargaining model without commitment. There a proposer has the right to change his mind: after the opponent's acceptance of his offer, the proposer may reject the acceptance. In previous work, Muthoo showed that every allocation could be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium in the one-good case when commitment is lacking. I extend Muthoo's model to the case of two-good bargaining, paying particular attention to how players reach an agreement. In two-good bargaining, an agreement on both goods need not necessarily occur simultaneously. I identify equilibria in which agreement occurs simultaneously and other equilibria where agreement occurs sequentially.
520 $a In chapter 3, I depart from the standard bargaining models, introducing complexity considerations into Muthoo's model with a single good. A naive concept of complexity is employed in which a taste for simplicity has only a second-order effect on players' overall preferences. I show that the introduction of such complexity considerations reduces the number of equilibria dramatically, and that only Rubinstein's celebrated stationary equilibrium survives in the game. This stands in sharp contrast to the results of Muthoo.
590 $a School code: 0017.
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
690 $a 0511
710 2 0 $a Boston University. $3 1017454
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 61-04A.
790 $a 0017
790 1 0 $a Rosenthal, Robert W., $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2001
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9967161