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Essays on financial intermediation a...

Shen, Minggao.

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Essays on financial intermediation and transition in rural China.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on financial intermediation and transition in rural China./
Author:	Shen, Minggao.
Description:	154 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Masahiko Aoki.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International62-09A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Banking. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3026904
ISBN:	0493383425

Essays on financial intermediation and transition in rural China.
Shen, Minggao.

Essays on financial intermediation and transition in rural China. - 154 p.

Adviser: Masahiko Aoki.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2001.

This dissertation seeks to understand the evolution of financial intermediation in the course of China's economic transition. The research is based on a unique data set collected by the author and other collaborators. I first show that China's two-decade long financial reform is a spontaneous process that accommodates reforms in other sectors and responds to the economic and institutional environment in which financial institutions operate. Financial reform in China aims at providing the right incentives for the financial sector to make better decisions in credit allocation. By any measure, however, the financial reforms did not immediately create a conventional commercial banking sector. In the early reform period, bank managers chose to lend to collective enterprises to take the advantage of joint liability lending. The collapse of joint liability lending starting in the mid-1990s triggered a new push for bank commercialization. However, even after the second wave of policy changes, commercialization is incomplete, in part due to the concerns of the unfavorable environment. I then go into greater depth to examine a new explanation for the rise and fall of China's township and village enterprises, a story based on the willingness of banks to finance collective enterprise development. Beginning in the mid 1990s, liquidation costs fell, financial competition increased, real interest rates rose, and firm performance deteriorated. These changes led to a dramatic switch in the lending preferences of banks in favor of private firms. Empirical estimates of the determinants of bank lending preferences, the involvement of township leaders in lending, and the ability of firms to obtain loans strongly support our hypothesis. Lastly, I explain why financial liberalization at the macro level was not able to induce banking institutions to grant their local branches greater autonomy, but instead has led them to centralize lending authority. Decentralization facilitates efficient use of local information. However, agency problems and commitment failures may undermine the benefits of decentralization. In this essay, I empirically assess the determinants of the decentralization of lending authority. I conclude that agency problems (collusion and government influence) and commitment failures (excessive refinancing) explain the recent trend toward centralization.

ISBN: 0493383425Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018458
Business Administration, Banking.

Essays on financial intermediation and transition in rural China.
LDR:03246nam 2200277 a 45 001 929037
005 20110427
008 110427s2001 eng d
020 $a 0493383425
035 $a (UnM)AAI3026904
035 $a AAI3026904
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100 1 $a Shen, Minggao. $3 1252522
245 1 0 $a Essays on financial intermediation and transition in rural China.
300 $a 154 p.
500 $a Adviser: Masahiko Aoki.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-09, Section: A, page: 3137.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2001.
520 $a This dissertation seeks to understand the evolution of financial intermediation in the course of China's economic transition. The research is based on a unique data set collected by the author and other collaborators. I first show that China's two-decade long financial reform is a spontaneous process that accommodates reforms in other sectors and responds to the economic and institutional environment in which financial institutions operate. Financial reform in China aims at providing the right incentives for the financial sector to make better decisions in credit allocation. By any measure, however, the financial reforms did not immediately create a conventional commercial banking sector. In the early reform period, bank managers chose to lend to collective enterprises to take the advantage of joint liability lending. The collapse of joint liability lending starting in the mid-1990s triggered a new push for bank commercialization. However, even after the second wave of policy changes, commercialization is incomplete, in part due to the concerns of the unfavorable environment. I then go into greater depth to examine a new explanation for the rise and fall of China's township and village enterprises, a story based on the willingness of banks to finance collective enterprise development. Beginning in the mid 1990s, liquidation costs fell, financial competition increased, real interest rates rose, and firm performance deteriorated. These changes led to a dramatic switch in the lending preferences of banks in favor of private firms. Empirical estimates of the determinants of bank lending preferences, the involvement of township leaders in lending, and the ability of firms to obtain loans strongly support our hypothesis. Lastly, I explain why financial liberalization at the macro level was not able to induce banking institutions to grant their local branches greater autonomy, but instead has led them to centralize lending authority. Decentralization facilitates efficient use of local information. However, agency problems and commitment failures may undermine the benefits of decentralization. In this essay, I empirically assess the determinants of the decentralization of lending authority. I conclude that agency problems (collusion and government influence) and commitment failures (excessive refinancing) explain the recent trend toward centralization.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0770
710 2 0 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 62-09A.
790 $a 0212
790 1 0 $a Aoki, Masahiko, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2001
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3026904