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Justices, politicians and nomination...

George Mason University.

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Justices, politicians and nominations: A strategic account of Supreme Court nominations.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Justices, politicians and nominations: A strategic account of Supreme Court nominations./
Author:	Mitchell, Matthew D.
Description:	128 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Thomas Stratmann.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-12A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3338537
ISBN:	9780549930433

Justices, politicians and nominations: A strategic account of Supreme Court nominations.
Mitchell, Matthew D.

Justices, politicians and nominations: A strategic account of Supreme Court nominations. - 128 p.

Adviser: Thomas Stratmann.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 2009.

Rational choice models of the Supreme Court have tended to follow one of two accounts: the attitudinal or the strategic account. A subset of strategic models, known as "separation of powers" models, examines strategic interaction between justices and politicians. Thus far, however, these models ignore an important dimension over which justices and politicians might bargain: the ideology of new members of the Court. A more complete separation of powers model would include the possibility that sitting justices might take the nominating decisions of the political branches into account when they vote. It would also include the possibility that politicians might take the voting habits of sitting members into account when they select new members of the Court. In Chapter Two, I introduce a spatial model that---to the best of my knowledge---is the first to account for this type of inter-branch bargaining. I show that, somewhat surprisingly, justices and politicians have more to gain the less they agree. In Chapter Three, I expand the model by introducing imperfect information and model the interaction in a game theoretic. I model the important role that uncertainty may play in facilitating exchange. In Chapter Four, I test the effect of a vacancy on Supreme Court voting behavior. I find that liberal justices seem to deviate from their usual voting patterns when the political branches are considering new appointees to the Court. This may be taken as some support for the strategic account presented here.

ISBN: 9780549930433Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Justices, politicians and nominations: A strategic account of Supreme Court nominations.
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100 1 $a Mitchell, Matthew D. $3 1065447
245 1 0 $a Justices, politicians and nominations: A strategic account of Supreme Court nominations.
300 $a 128 p.
500 $a Adviser: Thomas Stratmann.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-12, Section: A, page: 4807.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 2009.
520 $a Rational choice models of the Supreme Court have tended to follow one of two accounts: the attitudinal or the strategic account. A subset of strategic models, known as "separation of powers" models, examines strategic interaction between justices and politicians. Thus far, however, these models ignore an important dimension over which justices and politicians might bargain: the ideology of new members of the Court. A more complete separation of powers model would include the possibility that sitting justices might take the nominating decisions of the political branches into account when they vote. It would also include the possibility that politicians might take the voting habits of sitting members into account when they select new members of the Court. In Chapter Two, I introduce a spatial model that---to the best of my knowledge---is the first to account for this type of inter-branch bargaining. I show that, somewhat surprisingly, justices and politicians have more to gain the less they agree. In Chapter Three, I expand the model by introducing imperfect information and model the interaction in a game theoretic. I model the important role that uncertainty may play in facilitating exchange. In Chapter Four, I test the effect of a vacancy on Supreme Court voting behavior. I find that liberal justices seem to deviate from their usual voting patterns when the political branches are considering new appointees to the Court. This may be taken as some support for the strategic account presented here.
590 $a School code: 0883.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Political Science, Public Administration. $3 1017438
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710 2 $a George Mason University. $3 1019450
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 69-12A.
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856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3338537