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Performance-expectation ratcheting, ...

University of California, Irvine.

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Performance-expectation ratcheting, corporate governance and earnings management.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Performance-expectation ratcheting, corporate governance and earnings management./
Author:	Tian, Feng.
Description:	105 p.
Notes:	Advisers: Mort Pincus; Christo Karuna.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-07A.
Subject:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3321603
ISBN:	9780549716976

Performance-expectation ratcheting, corporate governance and earnings management.
Tian, Feng.

Performance-expectation ratcheting, corporate governance and earnings management. - 105 p.

Advisers: Mort Pincus; Christo Karuna.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Irvine, 2008.

Asymmetric ratcheting means that a favorable performance variance (i.e., positive unexpected performance) in the prior year leads to a greater absolute change in the current year's performance expectation than does an unfavorable performance variance of the same magnitude. This study finds that asymmetric performance-expectation ratcheting is prevalent across publicly traded firms. It also finds that the extent of performance-expectation ratcheting is positively associated with the strength of external governance (i.e., shareholder rights). This paper also shows that such ratcheting affects earnings management decisions. Specifically, when a firm performs well in interim quarters (i.e., the first three fiscal quarters), managers facing intensive ratcheting attempt to decrease the reported earnings of the fourth quarter to build more "reserves" and rein in the increase of expectations for the future, compared to managers under little or no ratcheting. When underlying performance exceeds current performance expectations, managers under intensive ratcheting engage in income-decreasing accruals and real activities manipulation (i.e., sales manipulation, changes in discretionary expenses including R&D and SG&A, and underproduction). In addition, when there is a temporary earnings increase, managers facing intensive ratcheting tend to use real activities to manage earnings downward. The results are robust after controlling for various factors.

ISBN: 9780549716976Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Performance-expectation ratcheting, corporate governance and earnings management.
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020 $a 9780549716976
035 $a (UMI)AAI3321603
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040 $a UMI $c UMI
100 1 $a Tian, Feng. $3 1036227
245 1 0 $a Performance-expectation ratcheting, corporate governance and earnings management.
300 $a 105 p.
500 $a Advisers: Mort Pincus; Christo Karuna.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-07, Section: A, page: 2777.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Irvine, 2008.
520 $a Asymmetric ratcheting means that a favorable performance variance (i.e., positive unexpected performance) in the prior year leads to a greater absolute change in the current year's performance expectation than does an unfavorable performance variance of the same magnitude. This study finds that asymmetric performance-expectation ratcheting is prevalent across publicly traded firms. It also finds that the extent of performance-expectation ratcheting is positively associated with the strength of external governance (i.e., shareholder rights). This paper also shows that such ratcheting affects earnings management decisions. Specifically, when a firm performs well in interim quarters (i.e., the first three fiscal quarters), managers facing intensive ratcheting attempt to decrease the reported earnings of the fourth quarter to build more "reserves" and rein in the increase of expectations for the future, compared to managers under little or no ratcheting. When underlying performance exceeds current performance expectations, managers under intensive ratcheting engage in income-decreasing accruals and real activities manipulation (i.e., sales manipulation, changes in discretionary expenses including R&D and SG&A, and underproduction). In addition, when there is a temporary earnings increase, managers facing intensive ratcheting tend to use real activities to manage earnings downward. The results are robust after controlling for various factors.
590 $a School code: 0030.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 1020666
690 $a 0272
710 2 $a University of California, Irvine. $3 705821
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 69-07A.
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790 1 0 $a Karuna, Christo, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Pincus, Mort, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2008
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3321603