Language:
English
繁體中文
Help
回圖書館首頁
手機版館藏查詢
Login
Back
Switch To:
Labeled
|
MARC Mode
|
ISBD
Does shareholder-sponsored corporate...
~
The University of Texas at Arlington., Accounting.
Linked to FindBook
Google Book
Amazon
博客來
Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation.
Record Type:
Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:
Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation./
Author:
Wang, Xu.
Description:
152 p.
Notes:
Adviser: Chandra Subramaniam.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International69-07A.
Subject:
Business Administration, Accounting. -
Online resource:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3320160
ISBN:
9780549714811
Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation.
Wang, Xu.
Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation.
- 152 p.
Adviser: Chandra Subramaniam.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at Arlington, 2008.
This study investigates the role of shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals in monitoring top management compensation. In particular, I test whether theories of agency costs, corporate governance, and optimal contracting can explain why shareholders submit executive-pay proposals, and examine the economic consequences of these shareholder proposals for the targeted firms.
ISBN: 9780549714811Subjects--Topical Terms:
1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.
Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation.
LDR
:02423nam 2200337 a 45
001
861224
005
20100719
008
100719s2008 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020
$a
9780549714811
035
$a
(UMI)AAI3320160
035
$a
AAI3320160
040
$a
UMI
$c
UMI
100
1
$a
Wang, Xu.
$3
1028898
245
1 0
$a
Does shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal matter? The case of executive compensation.
300
$a
152 p.
500
$a
Adviser: Chandra Subramaniam.
500
$a
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-07, Section: A, page: 2778.
502
$a
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at Arlington, 2008.
520
$a
This study investigates the role of shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals in monitoring top management compensation. In particular, I test whether theories of agency costs, corporate governance, and optimal contracting can explain why shareholders submit executive-pay proposals, and examine the economic consequences of these shareholder proposals for the targeted firms.
520
$a
I find that firms are more likely to receive performance-oriented shareholder executive-pay proposals when the firms have higher agency costs, stronger shareholder rights, or higher unexpected executive compensation. Shareholder executive-pay proposals gain more voting support from shareholders if the proposals are performance-oriented (than non-performance-oriented), sponsored by pension or union funds (than individual or religious groups and other institutions). In one year subsequent to the year of receiving performance-oriented shareholder executive-pay proposals, proposal firms' executive pay-performance sensitivities in stock option grants, and cash and total compensation increase more than control firms'. In addition, CEOs' compensation structures shift more toward equity-based for the proposal firms than for control firms in the year subsequent to the proposal year.
590
$a
School code: 2502.
650
4
$a
Business Administration, Accounting.
$3
1020666
650
4
$a
Economics, Finance.
$3
626650
690
$a
0272
690
$a
0508
710
2
$a
The University of Texas at Arlington.
$b
Accounting.
$3
1028897
773
0
$t
Dissertation Abstracts International
$g
69-07A.
790
$a
2502
790
1 0
$a
Depken, Craig A.
$e
committee member
790
1 0
$a
Hall, Thomas W.
$e
committee member
790
1 0
$a
Ho, Li-Chen Jennifer
$e
committee member
790
1 0
$a
Sarkar, Salil K.
$e
committee member
790
1 0
$a
Subramaniam, Chandra,
$e
advisor
791
$a
Ph.D.
792
$a
2008
856
4 0
$u
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3320160
based on 0 review(s)
Location:
ALL
電子資源
Year:
Volume Number:
Items
1 records • Pages 1 •
1
Inventory Number
Location Name
Item Class
Material type
Call number
Usage Class
Loan Status
No. of reservations
Opac note
Attachments
W9074846
電子資源
11.線上閱覽_V
電子書
EB W9074846
一般使用(Normal)
On shelf
0
1 records • Pages 1 •
1
Multimedia
Reviews
Add a review
and share your thoughts with other readers
Export
pickup library
Processing
...
Change password
Login