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The politics of language regimes.

Emory University., Political Science.

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The politics of language regimes.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The politics of language regimes./
作者:	Liu, Amy H.
面頁冊數:	324 p.
附註:	Adviser: Thomas F. Remington.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International70-07A.
標題:	Language, General. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3360010
ISBN:	9781109231823

The politics of language regimes.
Liu, Amy H.

The politics of language regimes. - 324 p.

Adviser: Thomas F. Remington.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Emory University, 2009.

If language regimes are the rules that delineate which languages can be used when and where---thereby institutionalizing the distribution of linguistic powers---what explains a government's language regime choice? Specifically, under what conditions are linguistic powers concentrated in the hands of the dominant group language, shared across several different languages, and neutralized via a lingua franca? In the dissertation, I argue language regimes are political institutions, and by extension, language regime choice is the product of bargaining between linguistic groups over institutional designs. Employing a Rubenstein bargaining model, I formally demonstrate language regime choice is the product of two components: the second period uncertainty and the socioeconomic hierarchy. I argue we are most likely to see (1) power-concentrating language regimes when the politically non-dominant group is socioeconomically dominant but the likelihood of it coming to power is low; (2) power-neutralizing language regimes under the aforementioned socioeconomic hierarchy conditions but when the likelihood of the non-dominant group coming to power is high; and (3) power-sharing language regimes when the politically dominant group is also the socioeconomically advantaged group.

ISBN: 9781109231823Subjects--Topical Terms:

1018089
Language, General.

The politics of language regimes.
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300 $a 324 p.
500 $a Adviser: Thomas F. Remington.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-07, Section: A, page: .
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Emory University, 2009.
520 $a If language regimes are the rules that delineate which languages can be used when and where---thereby institutionalizing the distribution of linguistic powers---what explains a government's language regime choice? Specifically, under what conditions are linguistic powers concentrated in the hands of the dominant group language, shared across several different languages, and neutralized via a lingua franca? In the dissertation, I argue language regimes are political institutions, and by extension, language regime choice is the product of bargaining between linguistic groups over institutional designs. Employing a Rubenstein bargaining model, I formally demonstrate language regime choice is the product of two components: the second period uncertainty and the socioeconomic hierarchy. I argue we are most likely to see (1) power-concentrating language regimes when the politically non-dominant group is socioeconomically dominant but the likelihood of it coming to power is low; (2) power-neutralizing language regimes under the aforementioned socioeconomic hierarchy conditions but when the likelihood of the non-dominant group coming to power is high; and (3) power-sharing language regimes when the politically dominant group is also the socioeconomically advantaged group.
520 $a I test the generated propositions first on a cross-sectional dataset that includes all instances of political independence and democratic transitions between 1945 and 2000. I supplement the statistical analysis with a qualitative study of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to get at (1) not just whether but why there is a correlation between the variables of interest; and (2) the degree---as opposed to just the type---of linguistic distribution.
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710 2 $a Emory University. $b Political Science. $3 1020341
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 70-07A.
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