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Essays on Industrial Organization /

Berrutti Rampa, Juan Felipe,

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Essays on Industrial Organization /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Industrial Organization // Juan Felipe Berrutti Rampa.
作者:	Berrutti Rampa, Juan Felipe,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (237 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-06, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-06A.
標題:	American studies. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31634315
ISBN:	9798346858522

Essays on Industrial Organization /
Berrutti Rampa, Juan Felipe,

Essays on Industrial Organization /Juan Felipe Berrutti Rampa. - 1 electronic resource (237 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-06, Section: A.

This dissertation is composed of three chapters where I study how firms set prices and invest in product quality. In Chapter 1, titled "High Cotton: Vertical Integration in the US Market for Seeds", I study the impact of a vertical merger on prices, input costs, and product quality in the market for genetically engineered cotton seeds in the United States. Chapter 2, titled "Price Regulation of Agricultural Technology", analyzes the impact of price controls on the affordability and quality of genetically engineered cotton seeds in India. Finally, in chapter 3, titled "Market Power and the Business Cycle", I study the response of the price-cost margins of American publicly traded firms to macroeconomic shocks.Chapter 1 analyzes the trade-off between efficiency and foreclosure arising from vertical integration. I empirically study Monsanto's 2007 acquisition of Delta and Pine Land, the leading provider of genetically engineered (GE) cotton seeds in the United States. Using an original dataset constructed from publicly available information, I show that Monsanto increased the price of its genetic technology that it licensed to downstream rival firms after the merger. Using farm survey data, I find that seed costs paid by cotton farmers increased by at least 30% relative to farmers growing crops unaffected by the merger. Importantly, and in line with the previous results on input costs, I find that price effects are observed only in states where the vertically integrated firm's downstream affiliate had low pre-merger market shares. Put together, these results indicate the existence of substantial price effects of vertical integration. Finally, I show that the vertically integrated firm introduces products with higher yields relative to its competitors, a pattern consistent with merger induced efficiencies. I then develop and estimate a structural model to quantify the welfare impact of merger remedies put in place by the competition authorities in 2007. I find that these DOJ mandated divestitures increased consumer surplus by 0.5%.Chapter 2, coauthored with Matteo Ruzzante, studies the demand and supply-side consequences of price controls on genetically engineered cotton seeds in India. Leveraging the differential timing and intensity of this policy across states, we show that the government-mandated price reduction increased farmers' adoption of GE seeds by 20pp. Using newly assembled data from experimental field trials across India, we show that agronomic yields of new varieties worsen by 30% in price-controlled states. We develop and estimate a structural model of demand and supply of cotton seeds to quantify the welfare impact of these price and quality responses. Our results indicate that the policy increased aggregate farmer surplus. Importantly, we show that ignoring endogenous quality adjustments substantially overstates the policy's impact on welfare.Chapter 3, coauthored with Andrea Ferrara, investigates the response of price-cost margins to macroeconomic shocks. We use Compustat data on publicly traded US firms and empirically estimate markups using recent advances in the estimation of production functions. We combine these estimates with publicly available time series data on the business cycle to identify impulse-response functions of markups to monetary policy and factor price shocks. We find that markups are acyclical and do not seem to systematically respond to aggregate shocks. Our results suggest that inflationary pressures in the US economy are unlikely to be driven by firms exerting more market power.

English

ISBN: 9798346858522Subjects--Topical Terms:

2122720
American studies.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Antitrust

Essays on Industrial Organization /
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520 $a This dissertation is composed of three chapters where I study how firms set prices and invest in product quality. In Chapter 1, titled "High Cotton: Vertical Integration in the US Market for Seeds", I study the impact of a vertical merger on prices, input costs, and product quality in the market for genetically engineered cotton seeds in the United States. Chapter 2, titled "Price Regulation of Agricultural Technology", analyzes the impact of price controls on the affordability and quality of genetically engineered cotton seeds in India. Finally, in chapter 3, titled "Market Power and the Business Cycle", I study the response of the price-cost margins of American publicly traded firms to macroeconomic shocks.Chapter 1 analyzes the trade-off between efficiency and foreclosure arising from vertical integration. I empirically study Monsanto's 2007 acquisition of Delta and Pine Land, the leading provider of genetically engineered (GE) cotton seeds in the United States. Using an original dataset constructed from publicly available information, I show that Monsanto increased the price of its genetic technology that it licensed to downstream rival firms after the merger. Using farm survey data, I find that seed costs paid by cotton farmers increased by at least 30% relative to farmers growing crops unaffected by the merger. Importantly, and in line with the previous results on input costs, I find that price effects are observed only in states where the vertically integrated firm's downstream affiliate had low pre-merger market shares. Put together, these results indicate the existence of substantial price effects of vertical integration. Finally, I show that the vertically integrated firm introduces products with higher yields relative to its competitors, a pattern consistent with merger induced efficiencies. I then develop and estimate a structural model to quantify the welfare impact of merger remedies put in place by the competition authorities in 2007. I find that these DOJ mandated divestitures increased consumer surplus by 0.5%.Chapter 2, coauthored with Matteo Ruzzante, studies the demand and supply-side consequences of price controls on genetically engineered cotton seeds in India. Leveraging the differential timing and intensity of this policy across states, we show that the government-mandated price reduction increased farmers' adoption of GE seeds by 20pp. Using newly assembled data from experimental field trials across India, we show that agronomic yields of new varieties worsen by 30% in price-controlled states. We develop and estimate a structural model of demand and supply of cotton seeds to quantify the welfare impact of these price and quality responses. Our results indicate that the policy increased aggregate farmer surplus. Importantly, we show that ignoring endogenous quality adjustments substantially overstates the policy's impact on welfare.Chapter 3, coauthored with Andrea Ferrara, investigates the response of price-cost margins to macroeconomic shocks. We use Compustat data on publicly traded US firms and empirically estimate markups using recent advances in the estimation of production functions. We combine these estimates with publicly available time series data on the business cycle to identify impulse-response functions of markups to monetary policy and factor price shocks. We find that markups are acyclical and do not seem to systematically respond to aggregate shocks. Our results suggest that inflationary pressures in the US economy are unlikely to be driven by firms exerting more market power.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 0163
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653 $a Antitrust
653 $a Innovation
653 $a Market power
653 $a Mergers
653 $a Price controls
653 $a Vertical integration
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