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The Role of Deliberation in the Theo...

Schultz, Conner,

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The Role of Deliberation in the Theory of Normativity /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Role of Deliberation in the Theory of Normativity // Conner Schultz.
Author:	Schultz, Conner,
Description:	1 electronic resource (192 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-11A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31934542
ISBN:	9798315705345

The Role of Deliberation in the Theory of Normativity /
Schultz, Conner,

The Role of Deliberation in the Theory of Normativity /Conner Schultz. - 1 electronic resource (192 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-11, Section: A.

In this dissertation, I argue that deliberation is normatively important. The first four chapters center around the defense and application of a deliberative constraint on reasons--viz., the idea that reasons must be able to feature in deliberation. In Chapter 1, I argue that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons. In Chapter 2, I argue, on the basis of a deliberative constraint, that there is no norm of truth on belief. In Chapter 3, I argue, on the basis of a deliberative constraint, that there are no reasons for emotions. In Chapter 4, I argue that some philosophers have taken the consequences of a deliberative constraint too far: in particular, accepting a deliberative constraint does not rule out pragmatic reasons for beliefs, for, I argue, transparency is false. I depart from the deliberative constraint in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, I argue that our deliberative perspectives bear on what we ought to believe.

English

ISBN: 9798315705345Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Deliberation

The Role of Deliberation in the Theory of Normativity /
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245 1 0 $a The Role of Deliberation in the Theory of Normativity / $c Conner Schultz.
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300 $a 1 electronic resource (192 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-11, Section: A.
500 $a Advisors: Worsnip, Alex Committee members: Stroud, Sarah; Pryor, Jim; Neta, Ram; Maguire, Barry.
502 $b Ph.D. $c The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill $d 2025.
520 $a In this dissertation, I argue that deliberation is normatively important. The first four chapters center around the defense and application of a deliberative constraint on reasons--viz., the idea that reasons must be able to feature in deliberation. In Chapter 1, I argue that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons. In Chapter 2, I argue, on the basis of a deliberative constraint, that there is no norm of truth on belief. In Chapter 3, I argue, on the basis of a deliberative constraint, that there are no reasons for emotions. In Chapter 4, I argue that some philosophers have taken the consequences of a deliberative constraint too far: in particular, accepting a deliberative constraint does not rule out pragmatic reasons for beliefs, for, I argue, transparency is false. I depart from the deliberative constraint in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, I argue that our deliberative perspectives bear on what we ought to believe.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 0153
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Ethics. $3 517264
650 4 $a Epistemology. $3 896969
653 $a Deliberation
653 $a Normativity
653 $a Deliberative constraint
653 $a Pragmatic reasons
653 $a Transparency
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0393
690 $a 0394
710 2 $a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. $b Philosophy. $e degree granting institution. $3 3826046
720 1 $a Worsnip, Alex $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 86-11A.
790 $a 0153
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2025
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31934542