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Strategic incentive systems: A theor...

Vroom, Govert,

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Strategic incentive systems: A theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial incentives and competitive interaction /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Strategic incentive systems: A theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial incentives and competitive interaction // Govert Vroom.
作者:	Vroom, Govert,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (138 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 67-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International67-12A.
標題:	Competition. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3195925
ISBN:	9780542419195

Strategic incentive systems: A theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial incentives and competitive interaction /
Vroom, Govert,

Strategic incentive systems: A theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial incentives and competitive interaction /Govert Vroom. - 1 electronic resource (138 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 67-12, Section: A.

Competitive strategy has typically dealt with firms as if they consist of unitary actors, while, in fact, individual managers within the firm may have different interests. My dissertation addresses this shortcoming by exploring whether and how internal firm characteristics---such as compensation schemes, organizational structure, and ownership form---affect managerial incentives, which, in turn, affect how firms compete. An idea central to the dissertation is that delegation of authority within the firm can be used as a strategic commitment device. The theoretical part of the dissertation uses a game-theoretical model to explore the relationship between organizational design and the intensity of rivalry. Previous studies have found that firms may use their organizational design to commit to behaving aggressively if competition takes place in strategic substitutes. This typically leads to a prisoner's dilemma in which firms behave too aggressively and industry profits decline. In this study, I show that the interaction between multiple elements of organizational design, i.e., compensation schemes and organizational structure, may lead to endogenous heterogeneity in incentives and a reduction, rather than an increase, in the intensity of rivalry. This is an important finding because it shows how firm heterogeneity can solve the fore mentioned prisoner's dilemma. The empirical part of the dissertation uses a proprietary dataset of the Texas hotel industry to empirically investigate how ownership forms affect managerial incentives and pricing in different competitive contexts. I explore how the difference in ownership form between franchised and company-owned units influences the incentives of the managers who take the day-to-day decisions that constitute interfirm rivalry. I show that chains with company-owned units may restrict decision-making of local units as a credible commitment device to maintain high prices. Furthermore, I show that the payment of royalty fees reduces the net available revenues of franchisees, which provides an incentive to increase the price they charge to customers. By elucidating the competitive consequences of ownership, this study allows firms to take these consequences into consideration when determining the ownership structure of local units.

English

ISBN: 9780542419195Subjects--Topical Terms:

537031
Competition.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Competitive interaction

Strategic incentive systems: A theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial incentives and competitive interaction /
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520 $a Competitive strategy has typically dealt with firms as if they consist of unitary actors, while, in fact, individual managers within the firm may have different interests. My dissertation addresses this shortcoming by exploring whether and how internal firm characteristics---such as compensation schemes, organizational structure, and ownership form---affect managerial incentives, which, in turn, affect how firms compete. An idea central to the dissertation is that delegation of authority within the firm can be used as a strategic commitment device. The theoretical part of the dissertation uses a game-theoretical model to explore the relationship between organizational design and the intensity of rivalry. Previous studies have found that firms may use their organizational design to commit to behaving aggressively if competition takes place in strategic substitutes. This typically leads to a prisoner's dilemma in which firms behave too aggressively and industry profits decline. In this study, I show that the interaction between multiple elements of organizational design, i.e., compensation schemes and organizational structure, may lead to endogenous heterogeneity in incentives and a reduction, rather than an increase, in the intensity of rivalry. This is an important finding because it shows how firm heterogeneity can solve the fore mentioned prisoner's dilemma. The empirical part of the dissertation uses a proprietary dataset of the Texas hotel industry to empirically investigate how ownership forms affect managerial incentives and pricing in different competitive contexts. I explore how the difference in ownership form between franchised and company-owned units influences the incentives of the managers who take the day-to-day decisions that constitute interfirm rivalry. I show that chains with company-owned units may restrict decision-making of local units as a credible commitment device to maintain high prices. Furthermore, I show that the payment of royalty fees reduces the net available revenues of franchisees, which provides an incentive to increase the price they charge to customers. By elucidating the competitive consequences of ownership, this study allows firms to take these consequences into consideration when determining the ownership structure of local units.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 1209
650 4 $a Competition. $3 537031
650 4 $a Ownership. $3 3680792
650 4 $a Studies. $3 3433795
650 4 $a Aggressiveness. $3 578384
653 $a Competitive interaction
653 $a Incentive
653 $a Managerial incentives
653 $a Organizational design
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710 2 $a INSEAD (France and Singapore). $e degree granting institution. $3 3825783
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