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Bamboo walls and brick ramparts: Ren...

Wedeman, Andrew Hall,

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Bamboo walls and brick ramparts: Rent-seeking, interregional economic conflict, and local protectionism in China, 1984-1991 /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Bamboo walls and brick ramparts: Rent-seeking, interregional economic conflict, and local protectionism in China, 1984-1991 // Andrew Hall Wedeman.
Author:	Wedeman, Andrew Hall,
Description:	1 electronic resource (553 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 56-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International56-11A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9519001
ISBN:	9798209440185

Bamboo walls and brick ramparts: Rent-seeking, interregional economic conflict, and local protectionism in China, 1984-1991 /
Wedeman, Andrew Hall,

Bamboo walls and brick ramparts: Rent-seeking, interregional economic conflict, and local protectionism in China, 1984-1991 /Andrew Hall Wedeman. - 1 electronic resource (553 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 56-11, Section: A.

This dissertation examines the rise and fall of local protectionism in China. Contrary to the intent of reforms aimed at opening China's inner doors, rent-seeking local governments erected illegal export and import barriers during the later 1980s, triggering a series of interregional resource wars and eventually threatening to carve up the Chinese economy into "economic fiefdoms." The "crisis of local protectionism" however, passed in the fall of 1990 when a new centrally orchestrated antiprotectionism campaign succeeded in eliminating many local trade barriers. Using a game theoretic approach and data drawn from the Chinese press, this dissertation explains why central efforts to eradicate local protectionism faltered before 1990 but succeeded thereafter. Based on deductive analysis of three different types of local protectionism: export protectionism, import protectionism, and fiscal predation (illegal toll taking), I find that the structure of each game determines the probability of successful antiprotectionism. I find that the export-protection game was largely impervious to central attempts to prevent raw material producing regions from embargoing exports. I find that, because it was a form of prisoners' dilemma, the import-protection game was more amenable to central intervention. Finally, I find that the fiscal-predation game was largely self-regulating and local governments had incentives to move independently against illegal tolls when the center sought to eliminate these same barriers. Based on analysis of the economics of rents and the structure of the economy at the beginning of the reform period, I also find that given an initial condition of concurrent shortages of undervalued inputs and overvalued finished products, the export-protectionism game will play itself out first, followed by the import-protection game. I find also that, although unrelated to the structural factors which give rise to export and import protectionism, fiscal predation will tend to increase alongside import protectionism. Temporally, therefore, the local-protection game moved from conditions that did not favor successful antiprotectionism to conditions that did. Thus, I explain the rise and fall of local protectionism and the central government's successful 1990 antiprotectionism campaign in terms of changes in the structure of the local-protection game.

English

ISBN: 9798209440185Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.

Bamboo walls and brick ramparts: Rent-seeking, interregional economic conflict, and local protectionism in China, 1984-1991 /
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520 $a This dissertation examines the rise and fall of local protectionism in China. Contrary to the intent of reforms aimed at opening China's inner doors, rent-seeking local governments erected illegal export and import barriers during the later 1980s, triggering a series of interregional resource wars and eventually threatening to carve up the Chinese economy into "economic fiefdoms." The "crisis of local protectionism" however, passed in the fall of 1990 when a new centrally orchestrated antiprotectionism campaign succeeded in eliminating many local trade barriers. Using a game theoretic approach and data drawn from the Chinese press, this dissertation explains why central efforts to eradicate local protectionism faltered before 1990 but succeeded thereafter. Based on deductive analysis of three different types of local protectionism: export protectionism, import protectionism, and fiscal predation (illegal toll taking), I find that the structure of each game determines the probability of successful antiprotectionism. I find that the export-protection game was largely impervious to central attempts to prevent raw material producing regions from embargoing exports. I find that, because it was a form of prisoners' dilemma, the import-protection game was more amenable to central intervention. Finally, I find that the fiscal-predation game was largely self-regulating and local governments had incentives to move independently against illegal tolls when the center sought to eliminate these same barriers. Based on analysis of the economics of rents and the structure of the economy at the beginning of the reform period, I also find that given an initial condition of concurrent shortages of undervalued inputs and overvalued finished products, the export-protectionism game will play itself out first, followed by the import-protection game. I find also that, although unrelated to the structural factors which give rise to export and import protectionism, fiscal predation will tend to increase alongside import protectionism. Temporally, therefore, the local-protection game moved from conditions that did not favor successful antiprotectionism to conditions that did. Thus, I explain the rise and fall of local protectionism and the central government's successful 1990 antiprotectionism campaign in terms of changes in the structure of the local-protection game.
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