東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Reconceiving Virtue: A Mengzian Adap...

Lebkuecher, Gina Elizabeth,

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Reconceiving Virtue: A Mengzian Adaptation of Eudaimonic Virtue Ethics in Response to Contemporary Criticisms /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Reconceiving Virtue: A Mengzian Adaptation of Eudaimonic Virtue Ethics in Response to Contemporary Criticisms // Gina Elizabeth Lebkuecher.
Author:	Lebkuecher, Gina Elizabeth,
Description:	1 electronic resource (425 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-12A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30994819
ISBN:	9798382911939

Reconceiving Virtue: A Mengzian Adaptation of Eudaimonic Virtue Ethics in Response to Contemporary Criticisms /
Lebkuecher, Gina Elizabeth,

Reconceiving Virtue: A Mengzian Adaptation of Eudaimonic Virtue Ethics in Response to Contemporary Criticisms /Gina Elizabeth Lebkuecher. - 1 electronic resource (425 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.

The primary question my dissertation aims to answer is: how might eudaimonic virtue ethics be reimagined to respond to contemporary criticisms from disability scholars, feminists, and empirical psychology? To answer this, I introduce the Eudaimonic View of Virtue, or EV, and propose a Mengzian adaptation of the EV (EV-M) in response to these criticisms. The EV captures the four core claims to which eudaimonic virtue ethical theories are committed: (i) virtues, in the sense of excellent character traits or dispositions, are the foundation of ethics or ethical action (i.e., aretaicism); (ii) virtue is at least partially constitutive of human well-being/flourishing (i.e., eudaimonism); (iii) virtue or virtuous activity consists in the good performance of human function or fulfilling human nature (i.e., naturalism); and (iv) practical wisdom, in the sense of understanding how to live well, is required for achieving full virtue.For the EV, reason and emotions are both pivotal parts of virtue. However, there is disagreement among contemporary and historic eudaimonic virtue ethicists about what specific roles reason and emotion play-whether for Aristotle (the founder of the Western eudaimonic virtue ethics tradition) or in virtue ethical theory more broadly. The EV can be divided into (broadly) rational and emotional versions. I critically evaluate contemporary EV-based accounts in light of critiques from disability scholars, feminists, and psychologists, revealing rational versions' vulnerability to the first two avenues of critique and emotional versions' susceptibility to the third. In contrast to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which defines human nature through rational activity, Mengzi defines human nature through its potential for moral goodness; moreover, his moral psychology does not contain a rigid rational-emotional divide. This helps the Mengzian version of the EV evade criticisms from feminist and disability perspectives. Additionally, the EV-M's emphasis on the interdependence of society and individuals-through its focus on rituals and social roles-provides an avenue of response to the psychology critique. The EV-M thus serves as a resilient foundation for an improved EV.

English

ISBN: 9798382911939Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Aristotle

Reconceiving Virtue: A Mengzian Adaptation of Eudaimonic Virtue Ethics in Response to Contemporary Criticisms /
LDR:03699nmm a22004453i 4500 001 2435284
005 20251001074906.5
006 m o d
007 cr|nu||||||||
008 261011s2024 miu||||||m |||||||eng d
020 $a 9798382911939
035 $a (MiAaPQD)AAI30994819
035 $a AAI30994819
040 $a MiAaPQD $b eng $c MiAaPQD $e rda
100 1 $a Lebkuecher, Gina Elizabeth, $e author. $3 3825543
245 1 0 $a Reconceiving Virtue: A Mengzian Adaptation of Eudaimonic Virtue Ethics in Response to Contemporary Criticisms / $c Gina Elizabeth Lebkuecher.
264 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2024
300 $a 1 electronic resource (425 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
500 $a Advisors: Vukov, Joseph Committee members: Kim, Richard; Hartman, Peter; Van Norden, Bryan W.
502 $b Ph.D. $c Loyola University Chicago $d 2024.
520 $a The primary question my dissertation aims to answer is: how might eudaimonic virtue ethics be reimagined to respond to contemporary criticisms from disability scholars, feminists, and empirical psychology? To answer this, I introduce the Eudaimonic View of Virtue, or EV, and propose a Mengzian adaptation of the EV (EV-M) in response to these criticisms. The EV captures the four core claims to which eudaimonic virtue ethical theories are committed: (i) virtues, in the sense of excellent character traits or dispositions, are the foundation of ethics or ethical action (i.e., aretaicism); (ii) virtue is at least partially constitutive of human well-being/flourishing (i.e., eudaimonism); (iii) virtue or virtuous activity consists in the good performance of human function or fulfilling human nature (i.e., naturalism); and (iv) practical wisdom, in the sense of understanding how to live well, is required for achieving full virtue.For the EV, reason and emotions are both pivotal parts of virtue. However, there is disagreement among contemporary and historic eudaimonic virtue ethicists about what specific roles reason and emotion play-whether for Aristotle (the founder of the Western eudaimonic virtue ethics tradition) or in virtue ethical theory more broadly. The EV can be divided into (broadly) rational and emotional versions. I critically evaluate contemporary EV-based accounts in light of critiques from disability scholars, feminists, and psychologists, revealing rational versions' vulnerability to the first two avenues of critique and emotional versions' susceptibility to the third. In contrast to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which defines human nature through rational activity, Mengzi defines human nature through its potential for moral goodness; moreover, his moral psychology does not contain a rigid rational-emotional divide. This helps the Mengzian version of the EV evade criticisms from feminist and disability perspectives. Additionally, the EV-M's emphasis on the interdependence of society and individuals-through its focus on rituals and social roles-provides an avenue of response to the psychology critique. The EV-M thus serves as a resilient foundation for an improved EV.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 0112
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Ethics. $3 517264
650 4 $a Logic. $3 529544
650 4 $a Philosophy of science. $2 bicssc $3 2079849
653 $a Aristotle
653 $a Confucianism
653 $a Mengzi
653 $a Moral psychology
653 $a Virtue ethics
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0394
690 $a 0402
690 $a 0395
710 2 $a Loyola University Chicago. $b Philosophy. $e degree granting institution. $3 3825544
720 1 $a Vukov, Joseph $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 85-12A.
790 $a 0112
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2024
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30994819