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Frontiers of Information and Platfor...

Ken, Qian Zhang,

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Frontiers of Information and Platform Design in Operations Management /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Frontiers of Information and Platform Design in Operations Management // Qian Zhang Ken.
Author:	Ken, Qian Zhang,
Description:	1 electronic resource (159 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-05B.
Subject:	Graphic arts. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31628719
ISBN:	9798346371236

Frontiers of Information and Platform Design in Operations Management /
Ken, Qian Zhang,

Frontiers of Information and Platform Design in Operations Management /Qian Zhang Ken. - 1 electronic resource (159 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: B.

This dissertation revolves around the intricate domains of information and mechanism design in operations management, presented in two essays. The first essay delves into the concerns surrounding customer apprehensions about price discrimination and explores the optimal utilization of information to alleviate such concerns. Employing a correlated Bayesian persuasion framework, we uncover the conditions under which a binary inventory signal complements pricing strategies, concurrently enhancing firm revenue and customer welfare. In the second essay, we study the design of rating platforms in the presence of disconfirmation effects, i.e., when customers incorporate their prior belief of the product into their ratings. The study elucidates the pivotal role of reference effects in shaping rating convergence to true product quality.In the first essay, we focus on the strategic information transmission between firms and strategic customers. Customers have heterogeneous valuations for the products and services, and firms use various price discrimination tactics where they charge different prices to different customers. This practice, i.e., customizing the price for individual customers, is known as personalized pricing (PP) and is implemented in various industries. We investigate whether pricing can informatively signal PP to customers and how firms should adjust pricing strategies in response to customer reactions. We also investigate whether disclosing inventory information can benefit firms and customers, ultimately advocating for increased transparency in PP practices. By modeling dynamic interactions between firms and a continuum of heterogeneous strategic customers over two periods, we unveil nuanced insights. We find that firms reduce the first-period price to persuade high-valuation customers to purchase in the first period, even when they do not intend to implement PP. This is because the mere presence of PP risk makes customers reluctant to reveal their identity. The firm then must "compensate" customers to persuade them to reveal their valuations. We show that the price alone cannot perfectly signal the firm's PP intention when the firm takes the strategic customer behavior into account. We next consider whether customers can infer the implementation of PP from the inventory availability information. To study this, we focus on a class of binary signals where the firm marks the inventory low when it is below a threshold. Such inventory signals are commonly adopted by retailers such as IKEA and ZARA. We show that an inventory signal can improve the firm revenue only when customers believe the firm conducts PP with a sufficiently low probability. In this case, an inventory signal alleviates customer PP concerns and allows the firm to set higher prices. Additionally, we demonstrate that disclosing inventory availability information is a strategic complement to the prices when alleviating the customer PP concerns. Furthermore, an inventory signal, in addition to the firm, can benefit all customers. With the growing interest in PP regulation, requiring firms to disclose inventory availability information could be a viable policy to make PP more transparent and credibly reduce customer concerns.In the second essay, we study the customers' social learning problem upon observing the product ratings. Customers and platforms increasingly rely on online ratings to assess the quality of products and services. However, customer ratings are susceptible to various biases.

English

ISBN: 9798346371236Subjects--Topical Terms:

523588
Graphic arts.

Frontiers of Information and Platform Design in Operations Management /
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: B.
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520 $a This dissertation revolves around the intricate domains of information and mechanism design in operations management, presented in two essays. The first essay delves into the concerns surrounding customer apprehensions about price discrimination and explores the optimal utilization of information to alleviate such concerns. Employing a correlated Bayesian persuasion framework, we uncover the conditions under which a binary inventory signal complements pricing strategies, concurrently enhancing firm revenue and customer welfare. In the second essay, we study the design of rating platforms in the presence of disconfirmation effects, i.e., when customers incorporate their prior belief of the product into their ratings. The study elucidates the pivotal role of reference effects in shaping rating convergence to true product quality.In the first essay, we focus on the strategic information transmission between firms and strategic customers. Customers have heterogeneous valuations for the products and services, and firms use various price discrimination tactics where they charge different prices to different customers. This practice, i.e., customizing the price for individual customers, is known as personalized pricing (PP) and is implemented in various industries. We investigate whether pricing can informatively signal PP to customers and how firms should adjust pricing strategies in response to customer reactions. We also investigate whether disclosing inventory information can benefit firms and customers, ultimately advocating for increased transparency in PP practices. By modeling dynamic interactions between firms and a continuum of heterogeneous strategic customers over two periods, we unveil nuanced insights. We find that firms reduce the first-period price to persuade high-valuation customers to purchase in the first period, even when they do not intend to implement PP. This is because the mere presence of PP risk makes customers reluctant to reveal their identity. The firm then must "compensate" customers to persuade them to reveal their valuations. We show that the price alone cannot perfectly signal the firm's PP intention when the firm takes the strategic customer behavior into account. We next consider whether customers can infer the implementation of PP from the inventory availability information. To study this, we focus on a class of binary signals where the firm marks the inventory low when it is below a threshold. Such inventory signals are commonly adopted by retailers such as IKEA and ZARA. We show that an inventory signal can improve the firm revenue only when customers believe the firm conducts PP with a sufficiently low probability. In this case, an inventory signal alleviates customer PP concerns and allows the firm to set higher prices. Additionally, we demonstrate that disclosing inventory availability information is a strategic complement to the prices when alleviating the customer PP concerns. Furthermore, an inventory signal, in addition to the firm, can benefit all customers. With the growing interest in PP regulation, requiring firms to disclose inventory availability information could be a viable policy to make PP more transparent and credibly reduce customer concerns.In the second essay, we study the customers' social learning problem upon observing the product ratings. Customers and platforms increasingly rely on online ratings to assess the quality of products and services. However, customer ratings are susceptible to various biases.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 0178
650 4 $a Graphic arts. $3 523588
650 4 $a Decision making. $3 517204
650 4 $a Prices. $3 652651
650 4 $a Design. $3 518875
690 $a 0501
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710 2 $a University of Pittsburgh. $e degree granting institution. $3 3759199
720 1 $a Aflaki, Arian $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 86-05B.
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2024
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