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Normative Consent and Epistemic Conc...

Hall, James,

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Normative Consent and Epistemic Conceptions of Democratic Authority /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Normative Consent and Epistemic Conceptions of Democratic Authority // James Hall.
Author:	Hall, James,
Description:	1 electronic resource (196 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-10, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-10A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31147897
ISBN:	9798382240336

Normative Consent and Epistemic Conceptions of Democratic Authority /
Hall, James,

Normative Consent and Epistemic Conceptions of Democratic Authority /James Hall. - 1 electronic resource (196 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-10, Section: A.

This work has two major goals. The first is to reframe the problem of political authority from its Conservative framing to a Reformist framing. This change creates a new benchmark for the success of a theory. Rather than justifying a pre-existing intuition, a theory can be successful if it could establish political authority whenever the state itself or an individual's relationship to it changes. This change also shifts the focus from the state's right to rule to moral housekeeping. In other words, the main goal is not to see when the state can use coercion against its citizens but rather to determine what political obligations citizens could have under different scenarios so that citizens can more accurately keep track of their moral reasons for action. The second major goal is to call into question epistemic theories of democratic authority through a critical examination of David Estlund's theory of normative consent. Normative consent cannot establish political authority. Even granting that it could, normative consent would bind individuals to epistemic procedures rather than democratic procedures given that epistemic procedures better solve the moral problems that generate normative consent. However, this then raises worries from the public reason perspective that epistemic procedures would impose a procedure on some citizens which they could reject from a qualified position. To overcome this worry, it is shown that epistemic procedures based on reducing the power of the ignorant rather than raising the power of the experts are not open to such qualified rejection, and democratic procedures in the real world will do no better than a coin flip at selecting correct policies. In the end, one branch of epistemic conceptions of democratic authority are proven untenable.

English

ISBN: 9798382240336Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Authority

Normative Consent and Epistemic Conceptions of Democratic Authority /
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520 $a This work has two major goals. The first is to reframe the problem of political authority from its Conservative framing to a Reformist framing. This change creates a new benchmark for the success of a theory. Rather than justifying a pre-existing intuition, a theory can be successful if it could establish political authority whenever the state itself or an individual's relationship to it changes. This change also shifts the focus from the state's right to rule to moral housekeeping. In other words, the main goal is not to see when the state can use coercion against its citizens but rather to determine what political obligations citizens could have under different scenarios so that citizens can more accurately keep track of their moral reasons for action. The second major goal is to call into question epistemic theories of democratic authority through a critical examination of David Estlund's theory of normative consent. Normative consent cannot establish political authority. Even granting that it could, normative consent would bind individuals to epistemic procedures rather than democratic procedures given that epistemic procedures better solve the moral problems that generate normative consent. However, this then raises worries from the public reason perspective that epistemic procedures would impose a procedure on some citizens which they could reject from a qualified position. To overcome this worry, it is shown that epistemic procedures based on reducing the power of the ignorant rather than raising the power of the experts are not open to such qualified rejection, and democratic procedures in the real world will do no better than a coin flip at selecting correct policies. In the end, one branch of epistemic conceptions of democratic authority are proven untenable.
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650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
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653 $a Authority
653 $a Democracy
653 $a Epistemic conceptions
653 $a Epistocracy
653 $a Legitimacy
653 $a Obligation
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