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The Economics of Gender in Low-Incom...

Buchmann, Nina Caroline,

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The Economics of Gender in Low-Income Countries /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Economics of Gender in Low-Income Countries // Nina Caroline Buchmann.
Author:	Buchmann, Nina Caroline,
Description:	1 electronic resource (381 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-04B.
Subject:	Gender. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31520265
ISBN:	9798342110242

The Economics of Gender in Low-Income Countries /
Buchmann, Nina Caroline,

The Economics of Gender in Low-Income Countries /Nina Caroline Buchmann. - 1 electronic resource (381 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: B.

This dissertation consists of three papers exploring the economics of gender in low-income countries. In the first paper, Carl Meyer, Colin Sullivan, and I define paternalistic discrimination,the differential treatment of two groups to protect one group-even against its will-from harmful or unpleasant situations. We combine two field experiments in which we observe real hiring and application decisions for a night-shift job in Bangladesh with a structural labor model to show that paternalistic discriminationcan be an important driver of gender employment and wage gaps for jobs that are considered much less pleasant for one group. In the second paper, Pascaline Dupas, Roberta Ziparo, and I examine whether the size of discretionary transfers from husbands to wives is driven in part by husbands' beliefs that their wives will utilize their allowance wisely, and show how this creates incentives for wives to maintain their reputation as expert investors-even at efficiency costs to the household. We test the model using three lab-in-the-field experiment with couples in Malawi. In the third paper, Erica Field, Rachel Glennerster, Shahana Nazneen, Xiao Yu Wang, and I experimentally evaluate the effects on child marriage of a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls' empowerment program in Bangladesh. We show that our results are consistent with a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but preferred types (socially conservative girls) have lower returns to delaying marriage. In the first paper, we study a novel form of discrimination in a setting with a strong norm to protect women. We combine two field experiments in Bangladesh with a structural labor model to define and test for paternalistic discrimination, the differential treatment of two groups to protect one group-even against its will-from harmful or unpleasant situations. We observe real hiring and application decisions for a night-shift job that provides safe worker transport home at the end of the shift. In the first experiment, we vary employers' perceptions of job costs to female workers by experimentally varying information about the transport but holding taste-based and statistical discrimination constant. Not informing employers about the transport decreases demand for female labor by 22%. Employers respond more to transport information than to a cash payment to female workers that would allow them to purchase safe transport for themselves. This suggests that employers paternalistically prevent women from making their own choices. In the second experiment, not informing applicants about the transport reduces female labor supply by 15%. In structural simulations that combine the results of both experiments, eliminating paternalistic discriminationreduces the gender employment gap by 48% and increases female wages by 68%.In the second paper, we study reputation dynamics within the household in a setting where women regularly receive transfers from their husbands for household purchases. We propose a signaling model in which wives try to maintain a good reputation in the eyes of their husband to receive high transfers. This leads them to (a) avoid risky purchases (goods with unknown returns); and (b) knowingly over-use low-return goods to hide bad purchase decisions-we call this the intra-household sunk cost effect.We present supportive evidence for the model from a series of experiments with married couples in rural Malawi.

English

ISBN: 9798342110242Subjects--Topical Terms:

2001319
Gender.

The Economics of Gender in Low-Income Countries /
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500 $a Advisors: Niederle, Muriel Committee members: Bernheim, B.; Fafchamps, Marcel; Voena, Alessandra.
502 $b Ph.D. $c Stanford University $d 2024.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three papers exploring the economics of gender in low-income countries. In the first paper, Carl Meyer, Colin Sullivan, and I define paternalistic discrimination,the differential treatment of two groups to protect one group-even against its will-from harmful or unpleasant situations. We combine two field experiments in which we observe real hiring and application decisions for a night-shift job in Bangladesh with a structural labor model to show that paternalistic discriminationcan be an important driver of gender employment and wage gaps for jobs that are considered much less pleasant for one group. In the second paper, Pascaline Dupas, Roberta Ziparo, and I examine whether the size of discretionary transfers from husbands to wives is driven in part by husbands' beliefs that their wives will utilize their allowance wisely, and show how this creates incentives for wives to maintain their reputation as expert investors-even at efficiency costs to the household. We test the model using three lab-in-the-field experiment with couples in Malawi. In the third paper, Erica Field, Rachel Glennerster, Shahana Nazneen, Xiao Yu Wang, and I experimentally evaluate the effects on child marriage of a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls' empowerment program in Bangladesh. We show that our results are consistent with a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but preferred types (socially conservative girls) have lower returns to delaying marriage. In the first paper, we study a novel form of discrimination in a setting with a strong norm to protect women. We combine two field experiments in Bangladesh with a structural labor model to define and test for paternalistic discrimination, the differential treatment of two groups to protect one group-even against its will-from harmful or unpleasant situations. We observe real hiring and application decisions for a night-shift job that provides safe worker transport home at the end of the shift. In the first experiment, we vary employers' perceptions of job costs to female workers by experimentally varying information about the transport but holding taste-based and statistical discrimination constant. Not informing employers about the transport decreases demand for female labor by 22%. Employers respond more to transport information than to a cash payment to female workers that would allow them to purchase safe transport for themselves. This suggests that employers paternalistically prevent women from making their own choices. In the second experiment, not informing applicants about the transport reduces female labor supply by 15%. In structural simulations that combine the results of both experiments, eliminating paternalistic discriminationreduces the gender employment gap by 48% and increases female wages by 68%.In the second paper, we study reputation dynamics within the household in a setting where women regularly receive transfers from their husbands for household purchases. We propose a signaling model in which wives try to maintain a good reputation in the eyes of their husband to receive high transfers. This leads them to (a) avoid risky purchases (goods with unknown returns); and (b) knowingly over-use low-return goods to hide bad purchase decisions-we call this the intra-household sunk cost effect.We present supportive evidence for the model from a series of experiments with married couples in rural Malawi.
546 $a English
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650 4 $a Reputations. $3 3562920
650 4 $a Underground construction. $3 1061609
650 4 $a Child marriage. $3 3824051
650 4 $a Individual & family studies. $3 2122770
650 4 $a Sociology. $3 516174
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710 2 $a Stanford University. $e degree granting institution. $3 3765820
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