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Essays in Empirical Market Design /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in Empirical Market Design // Pearl Ziqing Li.
Author:	Li, Pearl Ziqing,
Description:	1 electronic resource (258 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-03A.
Subject:	Traffic. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31460386
ISBN:	9798384335474

Essays in Empirical Market Design /
Li, Pearl Ziqing,

Essays in Empirical Market Design /Pearl Ziqing Li. - 1 electronic resource (258 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: A.

This dissertation is a collection of three essays in empirical market design. I study how the design of policies for transportation (Chapter 1), housing (Chapter 2), and government procurement (Chapter 3) affects efficiency, equity, and other objectives in these markets.The first chapter, coauthored with Cody Cook, studies the welfare and distributional effects of dynamically priced highway toll lanes. To quantify the equilibrium effects of tolling, we develop and estimate a model of driver demand, the road technology, and the pricing algorithm. The demand model features heterogeneous drivers choosing both where and when to drive, as well as uncertainty about prices and travel times. A key welfare channel is the option value of tolling: even drivers who infrequently take the priced lanes can benefit from having the option but not the obligation to pay for speed. The model is estimated using data on toll transactions, historical traffic conditions, and driver characteristics from the I-405 Express Toll Lanes in Washington State. Relative to a world in which the same number of highway lanes are all free, status-quo tolling increases aggregate welfare and benefits drivers in all income quartiles, driven in large part by the option value. Moreover, we find that drivers in the bottom income quartile gain the most under status-quo tolling. Low-income drivers have the longest I-405 commutes and they face low prices relative to their time savings from the priced lanes. They also have high option values of tolling because they are more price-sensitive, so they are more likely to be marginal when deciding between the priced and unpriced lanes. Finally, we show how simple revisions to the pricing algorithm can increase aggregate welfare and achieve redistributive goals.The second chapter, coauthored with Cody Cook and Ariel Binder, studies how the location of affordable housing affects tenant welfare, the distribution of assistance, and broader social objectives such as racial and economic integration. Using administrative data on households living in units funded by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, we first show that tenant characteristics such as income, race, and education vary widely across neighborhoods, despite common eligibility thresholds. To quantify the welfare implications, we develop and estimate a residential choice model in which households choose from both market-rate and affordable housing options, where the latter must be rationed. Using the estimated model, we show that moving a new development to a more opportunity-rich neighborhood increases aggregate tenant welfare and reduces both racial and economic segregation, but is also more costly and disproportionately benefits more moderate-need, non-Black/Hispanic households. This change in the distribution of assistance arises in part because of the rationing: households that only apply for assistance in opportunity-rich neighborhoods crowd out other households willing to apply anywhere. Relative to the initial choice of location, other policy levers---such as lowering the eligibility thresholds---have limited effects.The third chapter, coauthored with Nikhil Agarwal and Paulo Somaini, develops a general framework for identification using revealed preferences and applies it to study a combinatorial procurement auction in Chile. We establish identification results for a large class of models that have a linearly separable payoff structure, including widely studied models such as discrete and hedonic choice models, auctions, school choice mechanisms, oligopoly pricing, and trading games. We characterize the identified set and show that point identification can be achieved either if the choice set is sufficiently rich or if a variable that shifts preferences is available. Our identification results also suggest an estimation approach, which we implement to estimate values in a combinatorial procurement auction for school lunches in Chile. While package bidding allows firms to express across-unit cost complementarities in theory, we find limited pass-through of these cost complementarities to firms' bids in practice. We estimate large cost reductions from moving to the first-best Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.

English

ISBN: 9798384335474Subjects--Topical Terms:

3688933
Traffic.

Essays in Empirical Market Design /
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500 $a Advisors: Einav, Liran; Somaini, Paulo Committee members: Benkard, Lanier; Gentzkow, Matthew.
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520 $a This dissertation is a collection of three essays in empirical market design. I study how the design of policies for transportation (Chapter 1), housing (Chapter 2), and government procurement (Chapter 3) affects efficiency, equity, and other objectives in these markets.The first chapter, coauthored with Cody Cook, studies the welfare and distributional effects of dynamically priced highway toll lanes. To quantify the equilibrium effects of tolling, we develop and estimate a model of driver demand, the road technology, and the pricing algorithm. The demand model features heterogeneous drivers choosing both where and when to drive, as well as uncertainty about prices and travel times. A key welfare channel is the option value of tolling: even drivers who infrequently take the priced lanes can benefit from having the option but not the obligation to pay for speed. The model is estimated using data on toll transactions, historical traffic conditions, and driver characteristics from the I-405 Express Toll Lanes in Washington State. Relative to a world in which the same number of highway lanes are all free, status-quo tolling increases aggregate welfare and benefits drivers in all income quartiles, driven in large part by the option value. Moreover, we find that drivers in the bottom income quartile gain the most under status-quo tolling. Low-income drivers have the longest I-405 commutes and they face low prices relative to their time savings from the priced lanes. They also have high option values of tolling because they are more price-sensitive, so they are more likely to be marginal when deciding between the priced and unpriced lanes. Finally, we show how simple revisions to the pricing algorithm can increase aggregate welfare and achieve redistributive goals.The second chapter, coauthored with Cody Cook and Ariel Binder, studies how the location of affordable housing affects tenant welfare, the distribution of assistance, and broader social objectives such as racial and economic integration. Using administrative data on households living in units funded by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, we first show that tenant characteristics such as income, race, and education vary widely across neighborhoods, despite common eligibility thresholds. To quantify the welfare implications, we develop and estimate a residential choice model in which households choose from both market-rate and affordable housing options, where the latter must be rationed. Using the estimated model, we show that moving a new development to a more opportunity-rich neighborhood increases aggregate tenant welfare and reduces both racial and economic segregation, but is also more costly and disproportionately benefits more moderate-need, non-Black/Hispanic households. This change in the distribution of assistance arises in part because of the rationing: households that only apply for assistance in opportunity-rich neighborhoods crowd out other households willing to apply anywhere. Relative to the initial choice of location, other policy levers---such as lowering the eligibility thresholds---have limited effects.The third chapter, coauthored with Nikhil Agarwal and Paulo Somaini, develops a general framework for identification using revealed preferences and applies it to study a combinatorial procurement auction in Chile. We establish identification results for a large class of models that have a linearly separable payoff structure, including widely studied models such as discrete and hedonic choice models, auctions, school choice mechanisms, oligopoly pricing, and trading games. We characterize the identified set and show that point identification can be achieved either if the choice set is sufficiently rich or if a variable that shifts preferences is available. Our identification results also suggest an estimation approach, which we implement to estimate values in a combinatorial procurement auction for school lunches in Chile. While package bidding allows firms to express across-unit cost complementarities in theory, we find limited pass-through of these cost complementarities to firms' bids in practice. We estimate large cost reductions from moving to the first-best Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 0212
650 4 $a Traffic. $3 3688933
650 4 $a Low income groups. $3 3562917
650 4 $a Roads & highways. $3 3555163
650 4 $a Public housing. $3 2074204
650 4 $a Prices. $3 652651
650 4 $a Travel. $3 585743
650 4 $a Tolls. $3 3821634
650 4 $a Recreation. $3 535376
650 4 $a Social structure. $3 528995
650 4 $a Transportation. $3 555912
690 $a 0814
690 $a 0700
690 $a 0709
710 2 $a Stanford University. $e degree granting institution. $3 3765820
720 1 $a Einav, Liran $e degree supervisor.
720 1 $a Somaini, Paulo $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 86-03A.
790 $a 0212
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2024
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