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Essays in Experimental Development E...

Rodriguez Martinez, Andres F.,

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Essays in Experimental Development Economics /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in Experimental Development Economics // Andres F Rodriguez Martinez.
Author:	Rodriguez Martinez, Andres F.,
Description:	1 electronic resource (167 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-03B.
Subject:	Nominations. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31460326
ISBN:	9798384335054

Essays in Experimental Development Economics /
Rodriguez Martinez, Andres F.,

Essays in Experimental Development Economics /Andres F Rodriguez Martinez. - 1 electronic resource (167 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.

This dissertation encompasses three research projects in development economics that rely on experimental methods to further our understanding of the lives of people in low and middle income countries across multiple domains such as entrepreneurship, informal taxation, and politics. While each study aims to generate some generalizable knowledge, the real contribution of each chapter lies in the particularities of each context and the intricacies in economic and political behavior each project uncovers.In the first chapter, coauthored with Reka Zempleni, we study entrepreneurship in Colombia and whether a high entry rate among entrepreneurs with relatively low success potential can explain the general high failure rates observed relative to other countries. We test whether this hypothesis may be driven by entrepreneurs incorrectly estimating their success likelihood. Specifically, we test the relative roles of ambiguity preferences, confidence, and optimism and whether there are heterogeneities in these biases with regard to the true underlying potential for success as an entrepreneur. We recruit current, past, and aspiring Colombian entrepreneurs to participate in an online experiment. As part of the study, we simulate the decision to become an entrepreneur by having participants make an "entry decision" about playing an entrepreneurship-related game for stakes or taking a certain payment. We vary the available information to disentangle the potential behavioral biases leading to overentry. Providing information about the average likelihood of success encourages the lower potential participants to enter more, closing the slight gap between them and their higher potential counterparts at baseline. Information about the individualspecific skill-based success likelihood discourages some lower potential individuals, in some circumstances, suggesting over-confidence. Sharing information about the role of luck may discourage the lower potential participants, providing evidence against high levels of optimism or risk-seeking in this group. Taken together, the findings show that overconfidence among the lower potential individuals generates over-entry in this group, but the resulting high failure rate does not deter high-potential individuals' entry.Chapter 2 shifts to Sierra Leone and investigates the relative merit of traditional leaders in promoting cooperative behavior when informally taxing citizens' labor and whether this comes at the expense of relatively poor households. I designed a field experiment to measure whether citizens distort their behavior when facing informal taxation schemes by engaging in costly actions to avoid contributing their labor to a public good. I randomize communities into different methods to select contributors and compare the status quo of selection by chiefs versus two alternatives: random lotteries and progressive selection based on household surveys. Results show that chiefs' informal taxes distort individual behavior slightly less than the alternative mechanisms, revealing that chiefs can indeed promote pro-social behavior but not in a magnitude suggesting large efficiency gains. However, chief selection leads to less overall participant effort during the experiment, suggesting that chiefs' involvement does alter people's incentives during income-generating tasks. When focusing on differences by wealth, I also find chiefs do generate distortions among the poorest households, which are more likely to accept lower wages to avoid being informally taxed by chiefs. On the other hand, progressive selection is slightly more distortionary than chief selection in terms of people avoiding informal taxes through costly actions, shifting costs toward people with intermediate levels of wealth. This result is driven by differences in self-perceptions of wealth and how surveys proxy for material wellbeing.

English

ISBN: 9798384335054Subjects--Topical Terms:

3564149
Nominations.

Essays in Experimental Development Economics /
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500 $a Advisors: Casey, Katherine; Chandrasekhar, Arun Committee members: Morten, Melanie.
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520 $a This dissertation encompasses three research projects in development economics that rely on experimental methods to further our understanding of the lives of people in low and middle income countries across multiple domains such as entrepreneurship, informal taxation, and politics. While each study aims to generate some generalizable knowledge, the real contribution of each chapter lies in the particularities of each context and the intricacies in economic and political behavior each project uncovers.In the first chapter, coauthored with Reka Zempleni, we study entrepreneurship in Colombia and whether a high entry rate among entrepreneurs with relatively low success potential can explain the general high failure rates observed relative to other countries. We test whether this hypothesis may be driven by entrepreneurs incorrectly estimating their success likelihood. Specifically, we test the relative roles of ambiguity preferences, confidence, and optimism and whether there are heterogeneities in these biases with regard to the true underlying potential for success as an entrepreneur. We recruit current, past, and aspiring Colombian entrepreneurs to participate in an online experiment. As part of the study, we simulate the decision to become an entrepreneur by having participants make an "entry decision" about playing an entrepreneurship-related game for stakes or taking a certain payment. We vary the available information to disentangle the potential behavioral biases leading to overentry. Providing information about the average likelihood of success encourages the lower potential participants to enter more, closing the slight gap between them and their higher potential counterparts at baseline. Information about the individualspecific skill-based success likelihood discourages some lower potential individuals, in some circumstances, suggesting over-confidence. Sharing information about the role of luck may discourage the lower potential participants, providing evidence against high levels of optimism or risk-seeking in this group. Taken together, the findings show that overconfidence among the lower potential individuals generates over-entry in this group, but the resulting high failure rate does not deter high-potential individuals' entry.Chapter 2 shifts to Sierra Leone and investigates the relative merit of traditional leaders in promoting cooperative behavior when informally taxing citizens' labor and whether this comes at the expense of relatively poor households. I designed a field experiment to measure whether citizens distort their behavior when facing informal taxation schemes by engaging in costly actions to avoid contributing their labor to a public good. I randomize communities into different methods to select contributors and compare the status quo of selection by chiefs versus two alternatives: random lotteries and progressive selection based on household surveys. Results show that chiefs' informal taxes distort individual behavior slightly less than the alternative mechanisms, revealing that chiefs can indeed promote pro-social behavior but not in a magnitude suggesting large efficiency gains. However, chief selection leads to less overall participant effort during the experiment, suggesting that chiefs' involvement does alter people's incentives during income-generating tasks. When focusing on differences by wealth, I also find chiefs do generate distortions among the poorest households, which are more likely to accept lower wages to avoid being informally taxed by chiefs. On the other hand, progressive selection is slightly more distortionary than chief selection in terms of people avoiding informal taxes through costly actions, shifting costs toward people with intermediate levels of wealth. This result is driven by differences in self-perceptions of wealth and how surveys proxy for material wellbeing.
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650 4 $a Behavior. $3 532476
650 4 $a Statistics. $3 517247
650 4 $a Success. $3 518195
650 4 $a Decision making. $3 517204
650 4 $a Causality. $3 770986
650 4 $a Local government. $3 562372
650 4 $a Skills. $3 3221615
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
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710 2 $a Stanford University. $e degree granting institution. $3 3765820
720 1 $a Casey, Katherine $e degree supervisor.
720 1 $a Chandrasekhar, Arun $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 86-03B.
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