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Military, Political, Cultural, and S...

Pilkington, Aaron R.,

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Military, Political, Cultural, and Societal Implications of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Passive Defense Strategy /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Military, Political, Cultural, and Societal Implications of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Passive Defense Strategy // Aaron R Pilkington.
Author:	Pilkington, Aaron R.,
Description:	1 electronic resource (639 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-04A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31490610
ISBN:	9798384456797

Military, Political, Cultural, and Societal Implications of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Passive Defense Strategy /
Pilkington, Aaron R.,

Military, Political, Cultural, and Societal Implications of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Passive Defense Strategy /Aaron R Pilkington. - 1 electronic resource (639 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: A.

Why did the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) adopt a passive defense strategy? This dissertation is the first to trace the institutional development of the IRI's passive defense strategy and its two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-led executive bodies: the Permanent Committee for Passive Defense (PCPD) and the National Passive Defense Organization (NPDO). Passive defense can be defined simply as defense without weapons, which includes all precautionary actions other than using weapons to minimize the effects of enemy hostile operations that increase deterrence, reduce vulnerability, sustain essential activities, promote national stability, and facilitate crisis management in the face of enemy threats. Passive defense is a comprehensive strategy, but in Iran, it was not applied simultaneously nor uniformly across all military and civil sectors. Therefore, this dissertation also seeks to determine why Iran prioritized passive defense in some fields over others. This within-case critical junctures analysis utilizes the process tracing method to examine how the IRI's passive defense strategy developed from 2002 to 2024. It also overlays the process tracing examination on a neoclassical realist model rooted in defensive realism to determine what prompted the Islamic Republic to adopt new policy measures, and then explores other variables to explain Iran's defense strategy outcomes - external assistance, urgency, threat assessment, capacity, and factional politics. This dissertation finds that IRI senior leadership interpreted two events as existential threats - post-9/11 U.S. military operations and hostile foreign and economic policy; and the 2009 Green Movement protests - which explain why Iran first implemented passive defense in the military sector after 2003, in the economy under Ahmadinejad, and in the fields of cyber operations and cultural security after 2009. In 2003, the supreme leader ordered the IRGC to implement a passive defense strategy and apply its principles to first protect military facilities and operations. He later ordered Iran to pursue a "resistance economy" based on passive defense principles, and charged the PCPD and NPDO to evaluate and mitigate all other areas of vulnerability that might be exploited by Iran's enemies, especially the United States. This process was sometimes facilitated and frustrated by different Iranian presidents and their ministries. Consequently, over the next two decades the supreme leader and the parliament granted the PCPD and NPDO greater authorities to force all government ministries, provinces, and cities to comply with passive defense regulations affecting every civil sector, including biotechnology, communications and cyberspace, culture, the economy, education, the energy sector, and urban planning. This dissertation finds that military and cultural threats prompted Iran to adopt a passive defense strategy and spurred its further development. It also finds that factional politics account for differences in the way sections of the IRI's elected and unelected leadership perceived threat levels and urgency, ultimately affecting the pace and trajectory of passive defense development. Perhaps most importantly, it finds that Iran's passive defense strategy is a key mechanism that accounts for the IRGC's ascent to the top of Iran's political hierarchy between 2002 and 2024.

English

ISBN: 9798384456797Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Defense strategy

Military, Political, Cultural, and Societal Implications of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Passive Defense Strategy /
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500 $a Advisors: Rhodes, Martin J.; Goldfischer, David Committee members: Hashemi, Nader.
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520 $a Why did the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) adopt a passive defense strategy? This dissertation is the first to trace the institutional development of the IRI's passive defense strategy and its two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-led executive bodies: the Permanent Committee for Passive Defense (PCPD) and the National Passive Defense Organization (NPDO). Passive defense can be defined simply as defense without weapons, which includes all precautionary actions other than using weapons to minimize the effects of enemy hostile operations that increase deterrence, reduce vulnerability, sustain essential activities, promote national stability, and facilitate crisis management in the face of enemy threats. Passive defense is a comprehensive strategy, but in Iran, it was not applied simultaneously nor uniformly across all military and civil sectors. Therefore, this dissertation also seeks to determine why Iran prioritized passive defense in some fields over others. This within-case critical junctures analysis utilizes the process tracing method to examine how the IRI's passive defense strategy developed from 2002 to 2024. It also overlays the process tracing examination on a neoclassical realist model rooted in defensive realism to determine what prompted the Islamic Republic to adopt new policy measures, and then explores other variables to explain Iran's defense strategy outcomes - external assistance, urgency, threat assessment, capacity, and factional politics. This dissertation finds that IRI senior leadership interpreted two events as existential threats - post-9/11 U.S. military operations and hostile foreign and economic policy; and the 2009 Green Movement protests - which explain why Iran first implemented passive defense in the military sector after 2003, in the economy under Ahmadinejad, and in the fields of cyber operations and cultural security after 2009. In 2003, the supreme leader ordered the IRGC to implement a passive defense strategy and apply its principles to first protect military facilities and operations. He later ordered Iran to pursue a "resistance economy" based on passive defense principles, and charged the PCPD and NPDO to evaluate and mitigate all other areas of vulnerability that might be exploited by Iran's enemies, especially the United States. This process was sometimes facilitated and frustrated by different Iranian presidents and their ministries. Consequently, over the next two decades the supreme leader and the parliament granted the PCPD and NPDO greater authorities to force all government ministries, provinces, and cities to comply with passive defense regulations affecting every civil sector, including biotechnology, communications and cyberspace, culture, the economy, education, the energy sector, and urban planning. This dissertation finds that military and cultural threats prompted Iran to adopt a passive defense strategy and spurred its further development. It also finds that factional politics account for differences in the way sections of the IRI's elected and unelected leadership perceived threat levels and urgency, ultimately affecting the pace and trajectory of passive defense development. Perhaps most importantly, it finds that Iran's passive defense strategy is a key mechanism that accounts for the IRGC's ascent to the top of Iran's political hierarchy between 2002 and 2024.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 0061
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
650 4 $a Middle Eastern studies. $3 3168421
650 4 $a Islamic studies. $2 bicssc $3 1082939
650 4 $a Military studies. $3 2197382
653 $a Defense strategy
653 $a Iran
653 $a IRGC
653 $a National Security Strategy
653 $a National Passive Defense Organization
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0555
690 $a 0601
690 $a 0750
690 $a 0512
710 2 $a University of Denver. $b Josef Korbel School of International Studies. $e degree granting institution. $3 3817532
720 1 $a Rhodes, Martin J. $e degree supervisor.
720 1 $a Goldfischer, David $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 86-04A.
790 $a 0061
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2024
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31490610