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The Spread of Corporate Misconduct: ...

Marangoni, Claudia,

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The Spread of Corporate Misconduct: Determinants, Consequences and Regulatory Responses /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Spread of Corporate Misconduct: Determinants, Consequences and Regulatory Responses // Claudia Marangoni.
Author:	Marangoni, Claudia,
Description:	1 electronic resource (158 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-05, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-05A.
Subject:	Violations. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29424532
ISBN:	9798352965993

The Spread of Corporate Misconduct: Determinants, Consequences and Regulatory Responses /
Marangoni, Claudia,

The Spread of Corporate Misconduct: Determinants, Consequences and Regulatory Responses /Claudia Marangoni. - 1 electronic resource (158 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-05, Section: A.

The incidents of corporate misconduct (e.g., corruption, fraudulent financial reporting, money laundering) have remarkably increased over the last two decades, causing considerable economic losses and producing long-lasting side effects for the economy worldwide (Conklin, 1977; Nelson, 2014; Soltes, 2016). The spread and severity of these incidents have motivated the literature in accounting, economics, and finance to investigate not only the drivers of corporate misconduct, but also its socio-political and economic consequences (e.g., Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004; Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal, 2015; Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman, 2018).Prior literature on corporate misconduct has reached consensus on two fronts. First, corporate misconduct occurs when firms are myopic in their decision-making and overvalue short-term results at the expense of long-term growth and economic value creation (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Bhojraj et al., 2009). Myopic behavior is triggered by several factors, such as firm characteristics (e.g., leverage, performance, size), corporate culture, capital market pressures, and weak governance and external monitoring mechanisms (e.g., DeFond and Park, 1997; Ndubizu, 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Liu, 2016; Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman, 2018). Second, corporate misconduct disrupts fair competition among firms and threatens the correct functioning of capital markets (e.g., Stein, 1989; Louis, 2004; Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Fan, 2007; Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007; Giannetti et al., 2021).The academic community is not the only group that has shown a continuous interest in corporate misconduct. Policymakers and regulators have also consistently treated this topic as a priority on their agendas. The laws and regulations on oversight and punishment of corporate misconduct have been constantly trying to adapt to its ever-changing forms, both within and across countries (Amiram et al., 2018). For example, in the U.S., the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 responded to the worldwide rise in corruption cases by making it illegal for U.S. corporations and foreign corporations with securities listed in the U.S. to bribe foreign government officials in exchange of business and other financial benefits.1 Moreover, following the egregious financial scandals involving publicly traded firms at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the SarbanesOxley (SOX) Act of 2002 introduced strict criminal punishments and investor protection measures to prevent future corporate frauds.2 In addition, in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 tightened investor protection requirements and securities regulation.3 Outside the U.S., among others, the European Union (EU) established the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in 1999 to protect the EU institutions against fraud and corruption.4Regulators have also recognized the importance of fighting corporate misconduct in a joint effort by establishing global regulatory frameworks.5 For example, in 1994 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions to adopt preventive measures against corruption, monitor the application of anti-bribery rules internationally, and enforce legal measures in case of noncompliance.6 Similarly, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) has been promoting international cooperation and law enforcement against corruption since 2005.7.

English

ISBN: 9798352965993Subjects--Topical Terms:

3558956
Violations.

The Spread of Corporate Misconduct: Determinants, Consequences and Regulatory Responses /
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520 $a The incidents of corporate misconduct (e.g., corruption, fraudulent financial reporting, money laundering) have remarkably increased over the last two decades, causing considerable economic losses and producing long-lasting side effects for the economy worldwide (Conklin, 1977; Nelson, 2014; Soltes, 2016). The spread and severity of these incidents have motivated the literature in accounting, economics, and finance to investigate not only the drivers of corporate misconduct, but also its socio-political and economic consequences (e.g., Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004; Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal, 2015; Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman, 2018).Prior literature on corporate misconduct has reached consensus on two fronts. First, corporate misconduct occurs when firms are myopic in their decision-making and overvalue short-term results at the expense of long-term growth and economic value creation (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Bhojraj et al., 2009). Myopic behavior is triggered by several factors, such as firm characteristics (e.g., leverage, performance, size), corporate culture, capital market pressures, and weak governance and external monitoring mechanisms (e.g., DeFond and Park, 1997; Ndubizu, 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Liu, 2016; Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman, 2018). Second, corporate misconduct disrupts fair competition among firms and threatens the correct functioning of capital markets (e.g., Stein, 1989; Louis, 2004; Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Fan, 2007; Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007; Giannetti et al., 2021).The academic community is not the only group that has shown a continuous interest in corporate misconduct. Policymakers and regulators have also consistently treated this topic as a priority on their agendas. The laws and regulations on oversight and punishment of corporate misconduct have been constantly trying to adapt to its ever-changing forms, both within and across countries (Amiram et al., 2018). For example, in the U.S., the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 responded to the worldwide rise in corruption cases by making it illegal for U.S. corporations and foreign corporations with securities listed in the U.S. to bribe foreign government officials in exchange of business and other financial benefits.1 Moreover, following the egregious financial scandals involving publicly traded firms at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the SarbanesOxley (SOX) Act of 2002 introduced strict criminal punishments and investor protection measures to prevent future corporate frauds.2 In addition, in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 tightened investor protection requirements and securities regulation.3 Outside the U.S., among others, the European Union (EU) established the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in 1999 to protect the EU institutions against fraud and corruption.4Regulators have also recognized the importance of fighting corporate misconduct in a joint effort by establishing global regulatory frameworks.5 For example, in 1994 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions to adopt preventive measures against corruption, monitor the application of anti-bribery rules internationally, and enforce legal measures in case of noncompliance.6 Similarly, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) has been promoting international cooperation and law enforcement against corruption since 2005.7.
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