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CEO Turnover and Internal Control Ma...

Li, Beidi,

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CEO Turnover and Internal Control Material Weaknesses /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	CEO Turnover and Internal Control Material Weaknesses // Beidi Li.
Author:	Li, Beidi,
Description:	1 electronic resource (161 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 75-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International75-03A.
Subject:	Investments. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3570412
ISBN:	9781303150852

CEO Turnover and Internal Control Material Weaknesses /
Li, Beidi,

CEO Turnover and Internal Control Material Weaknesses /Beidi Li. - 1 electronic resource (161 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 75-03, Section: A.

In this thesis I examine the relation between CEO turnover and subsequent internal control material weaknesses. Drawing on the literature that agency problems around CEO turnover are likely to increase and that CEO turnover causes organizational dislocation, I posit that CEO turnover may be associated with weak internal control quality. Using 7, 680 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2010 in the U.S. market, I document that firms with CEO turnover within three years before the internal control weakness disclosure tend to be associated with more internal control material weaknesses than firms without CEO turnover.This thesis also documents the impact of Chairman and CEO duality on the relation between CEO turnover and internal control material weaknesses. CEO and Chairman non-duality implies less interests alliance between the CEO and the shareholders and thus may lead to more agency problems around CEO turnover as well as more post-turnover organizational dislocation. The findings show that in firms whose CEO is not Chairman of the board the CEO turnover is significantly related with subsequent internal control material weaknesses while in firms whose CEO is also the Chairman the relation between CEO turnover and internal control material weakness is no longer significant.

English

ISBN: 9781303150852Subjects--Topical Terms:

566987
Investments.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Chief executive officers

CEO Turnover and Internal Control Material Weaknesses /
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245 1 0 $a CEO Turnover and Internal Control Material Weaknesses / $c Beidi Li.
264 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2012
300 $a 1 electronic resource (161 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 75-03, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisors: Gul, Ferdinand.
502 $b Ph.D. $c Hong Kong Polytechnic University (Hong Kong) $d 2012.
520 $a In this thesis I examine the relation between CEO turnover and subsequent internal control material weaknesses. Drawing on the literature that agency problems around CEO turnover are likely to increase and that CEO turnover causes organizational dislocation, I posit that CEO turnover may be associated with weak internal control quality. Using 7, 680 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2010 in the U.S. market, I document that firms with CEO turnover within three years before the internal control weakness disclosure tend to be associated with more internal control material weaknesses than firms without CEO turnover.This thesis also documents the impact of Chairman and CEO duality on the relation between CEO turnover and internal control material weaknesses. CEO and Chairman non-duality implies less interests alliance between the CEO and the shareholders and thus may lead to more agency problems around CEO turnover as well as more post-turnover organizational dislocation. The findings show that in firms whose CEO is not Chairman of the board the CEO turnover is significantly related with subsequent internal control material weaknesses while in firms whose CEO is also the Chairman the relation between CEO turnover and internal control material weakness is no longer significant.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 1170
650 4 $a Investments. $3 566987
650 4 $a Research & development--R&D. $3 3554335
650 4 $a Performance evaluation. $3 3562292
650 4 $a Research methodology. $3 3559994
650 4 $a Hypotheses. $3 3560118
650 4 $a Classification. $3 595585
650 4 $a Nonprofit organizations. $3 540326
650 4 $a Fraud. $3 721834
650 4 $a Investors. $3 3544951
650 4 $a Dishonesty. $3 3815730
650 4 $a Variables. $3 3548259
653 $a Chief executive officers
653 $a Executive turnover
653 $a Internal control
690 $a 0454
710 2 $a Hong Kong Polytechnic University (Hong Kong). $e degree granting institution. $3 3815729
720 1 $a Gul, Ferdinand $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 75-03A.
790 $a 1170
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2012
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3570412