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Does a Chief Audit Executive Matter?...

Zhang, Wei,

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Does a Chief Audit Executive Matter? Evidence from Corporate Disclosure of the Position /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Does a Chief Audit Executive Matter? Evidence from Corporate Disclosure of the Position // Wei Zhang.
Author:	Zhang, Wei,
Description:	1 electronic resource (70 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-11A.
Subject:	Managers. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13863764
ISBN:	9781392140956

Does a Chief Audit Executive Matter? Evidence from Corporate Disclosure of the Position /
Zhang, Wei,

Does a Chief Audit Executive Matter? Evidence from Corporate Disclosure of the Position /Wei Zhang. - 1 electronic resource (70 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-11, Section: A.

A Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is the leader of a company's internal audit function. Because there is no mandated disclosure requirement for the internal audit structure, little is understood about the influence of a CAE on a company. Following the logic that a CAE disclosed in SEC filings is more influential in a company's oversight function, I identify an influential CAE using the disclosure of the role. I then examine the association between an influential CAE and monitoring outcomes. Using data hand collected from SEC filings for S&P 1500 companies from 2004 to 2015, I find companies that have an influential CAE are generally larger, older, and have a larger corporate board. More importantly, I find that an influential CAE in NYSE-listed companies is associated with higher internal control quality. This association is stronger for companies that reference a CAE's direct interaction with the audit committee. This study provides an initial investigation into a common, but little understood position in corporate oversight.

English

ISBN: 9781392140956Subjects--Topical Terms:

1457937
Managers.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Chief Audit Executive

Does a Chief Audit Executive Matter? Evidence from Corporate Disclosure of the Position /
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100 1 $a Zhang, Wei, $e author. $3 3815531
245 1 0 $a Does a Chief Audit Executive Matter? Evidence from Corporate Disclosure of the Position / $c Wei Zhang.
264 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2019
300 $a 1 electronic resource (70 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-11, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisors: Lamoreaux, Phillip Committee members: Kaplan, Steve; Li, Yinghua.
502 $b Ph.D. $c Arizona State University $d 2019.
520 $a A Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is the leader of a company's internal audit function. Because there is no mandated disclosure requirement for the internal audit structure, little is understood about the influence of a CAE on a company. Following the logic that a CAE disclosed in SEC filings is more influential in a company's oversight function, I identify an influential CAE using the disclosure of the role. I then examine the association between an influential CAE and monitoring outcomes. Using data hand collected from SEC filings for S&P 1500 companies from 2004 to 2015, I find companies that have an influential CAE are generally larger, older, and have a larger corporate board. More importantly, I find that an influential CAE in NYSE-listed companies is associated with higher internal control quality. This association is stronger for companies that reference a CAE's direct interaction with the audit committee. This study provides an initial investigation into a common, but little understood position in corporate oversight.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 0010
650 4 $a Managers. $2 gtt $3 1457937
650 4 $a Hypotheses. $3 3560118
650 4 $a Variables. $3 3548259
650 4 $a Responsibilities. $3 3559997
650 4 $a Tenure. $3 3561541
650 4 $a Dependent variables. $3 3696640
653 $a Chief Audit Executive
653 $a Internal audit function
653 $a Oversight
690 $a 0272
710 2 $a Arizona State University. $b Accountancy. $e degree granting institution. $3 3815532
720 1 $a Lamoreaux, Phillip $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 80-11A.
790 $a 0010
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2019
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13863764