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Combined Action in Vietnam: U.S. Mar...

Sutton, Cavender S.,

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Combined Action in Vietnam: U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Thought and Practice, 1965-1971 /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Combined Action in Vietnam: U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Thought and Practice, 1965-1971 // Cavender S Sutton.
Author:	Sutton, Cavender S.,
Description:	1 electronic resource (416 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-11A.
Subject:	Military history. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31236399
ISBN:	9798382716350

Combined Action in Vietnam: U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Thought and Practice, 1965-1971 /
Sutton, Cavender S.,

Combined Action in Vietnam: U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Thought and Practice, 1965-1971 /Cavender S Sutton. - 1 electronic resource (416 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.

In August 1965, a contingent of United States Marines initiated the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program in the Republic of Vietnam. The program embedded small groups of fourteen Marines and a Navy medical Corpsman in villages throughout the country's five northernmost provinces. Their purpose was to train, advise, and fight alongside locally-raised militias known as Popular Forces (PF). The PF were minimally trained, paid, and equipped, yet they became an unlikely focal point in the Marines' strategy in Vietnam. Since the war, Combined Action is often discussed synonymously with counterinsurgency, a complex process that requires delicate blends of social, political, economic, and military initiatives. Such interpretations, however, do not account for the manner in which the Marines in the CAPs understood their jobs or their commanders' methods for assessing their activities in the villages. Both stemmed from the institutional culture the Marines built before Vietnam, and the counterinsurgency doctrine and knowledge they brought with them when they entered the war in 1965. Rather than attempt to assess Combined Action's success or failure as a counterinsurgency initiative, this work uses the program as a window into how Cold War Marines understood insurgencies and how that understanding influenced the techniques they used in Vietnam. It argues Combined Action was an evolving, initially ad hoc program that provided a way for the Marines to increase their capacity for area denial, but was later misconstrued as counterinsurgency. It shows that most of the program's actions, from beginning to end, were tailored toward disrupting communist operations and controlling space, but did little to build popular support for the GVN or train the Popular Forces to defend their villages on their own. Combined Action was thus an arm of counterinsurgency, but not COIN in and of itself, as it came to be remembered after the war.

English

ISBN: 9798382716350Subjects--Topical Terms:

552332
Military history.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Counterinsurgency

Combined Action in Vietnam: U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Thought and Practice, 1965-1971 /
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245 1 0 $a Combined Action in Vietnam: U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Thought and Practice, 1965-1971 / $c Cavender S Sutton.
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300 $a 1 electronic resource (416 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
500 $a Advisors: Lee, Wayne E. Committee members: Glatthaar, Joseph T. ; Daddis, Gregory A.; Morgan, Michael Cotey; Lentz, Christian C.
502 $b Ph.D. $c The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill $d 2024.
520 $a In August 1965, a contingent of United States Marines initiated the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program in the Republic of Vietnam. The program embedded small groups of fourteen Marines and a Navy medical Corpsman in villages throughout the country's five northernmost provinces. Their purpose was to train, advise, and fight alongside locally-raised militias known as Popular Forces (PF). The PF were minimally trained, paid, and equipped, yet they became an unlikely focal point in the Marines' strategy in Vietnam. Since the war, Combined Action is often discussed synonymously with counterinsurgency, a complex process that requires delicate blends of social, political, economic, and military initiatives. Such interpretations, however, do not account for the manner in which the Marines in the CAPs understood their jobs or their commanders' methods for assessing their activities in the villages. Both stemmed from the institutional culture the Marines built before Vietnam, and the counterinsurgency doctrine and knowledge they brought with them when they entered the war in 1965. Rather than attempt to assess Combined Action's success or failure as a counterinsurgency initiative, this work uses the program as a window into how Cold War Marines understood insurgencies and how that understanding influenced the techniques they used in Vietnam. It argues Combined Action was an evolving, initially ad hoc program that provided a way for the Marines to increase their capacity for area denial, but was later misconstrued as counterinsurgency. It shows that most of the program's actions, from beginning to end, were tailored toward disrupting communist operations and controlling space, but did little to build popular support for the GVN or train the Popular Forces to defend their villages on their own. Combined Action was thus an arm of counterinsurgency, but not COIN in and of itself, as it came to be remembered after the war.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 0153
650 4 $a Military history. $3 552332
650 4 $a American history. $3 2122692
650 4 $a Asian history. $2 bicssc $3 1099323
650 4 $a Military studies. $3 2197382
653 $a Counterinsurgency
653 $a U.S. Marine Corps
653 $a Vietnam War
653 $a Combined Action Platoon program
653 $a Popular Forces
690 $a 0722
690 $a 0750
690 $a 0332
690 $a 0337
710 2 $a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. $b History. $e degree granting institution. $3 3815278
720 1 $a Lee, Wayne E. $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 85-11A.
790 $a 0153
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2024
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31236399