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Theorizing the Dynamics of Civilian ...

Littlefield, Ned.

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Theorizing the Dynamics of Civilian Control Over Law Enforcement Militarization: A Case Study of the 2018 Federal Intervention of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Theorizing the Dynamics of Civilian Control Over Law Enforcement Militarization: A Case Study of the 2018 Federal Intervention of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil./
Author:	Littlefield, Ned.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2024,
Description:	417 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-11A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31244158
ISBN:	9798382332543

Theorizing the Dynamics of Civilian Control Over Law Enforcement Militarization: A Case Study of the 2018 Federal Intervention of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Littlefield, Ned.

Theorizing the Dynamics of Civilian Control Over Law Enforcement Militarization: A Case Study of the 2018 Federal Intervention of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024 - 417 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2024.

Why and to what effect do civilian institutions form to control law enforcement militarization? Facing extreme insecurity, Latin American democracies increasingly deploy soldiers for policing and operate police like soldiers. This trend risks undermining democratic governance in multiple respects (e.g., fueling human rights violations). However, civilians reportedly have few incentives and capabilities to control militarization by concluding troop deployments and reducing police violence.It therefore is puzzling that a coalition emerged to monitor the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, wherein the Brazilian Army controlled local policing. Moreover, the Intervention and preceding military operations in Rio de Janeiro were discontinued from 2019 to 2022. The Intervention saw considerably more police violence than prior military operations, which surprisingly had corresponded with fewer extrajudicial killings than non-deployment periods.To illuminate these puzzles, I argue that the autonomy paradox explains institutions' formation and impacts. Independence from militarization's principal and agents gives civilians the opportunity to establish institutions to contest militarization. Because autonomy limits their access to information, institutions must collect original information to monitor militarization. Such information could enable them to shape political discourse (by influencing critical media coverage) and, thus, military officials' concerns with deployments' legitimacy (by raising societal costs), potentially contributing to military lobbying against deployments.The paradox is that autonomy and its effects could limit institutions' access to military officials. Civilians thus have few opportunities to socialize officials against substituting military presence with police violence. Institutions could raise militarization's cost, potentially cannot facilitate demilitarization necessarily, and could have the unintended consequence of intensifying violence. Overcoming the paradox could require balancing independence and collaboration to increase socialization opportunities.I develop this argument by synthesizing theory on controlling the military and controlling militarization. The former entails monitoring the military to raise societal costs of disobeying civilian authority and socializing officials into considering this authority legitimate. The latter involves using political discourse to delegitimize military force. A theory-building case study advances the argument. Through process-tracing based on 119 interviews and several original datasets, I analyze whether autonomy was necessary and/or sufficient for institutions to form, monitor, and influence the Federal Intervention.

ISBN: 9798382332543Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Brazil

Theorizing the Dynamics of Civilian Control Over Law Enforcement Militarization: A Case Study of the 2018 Federal Intervention of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
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300 $a 417 p.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2024.
520 $a Why and to what effect do civilian institutions form to control law enforcement militarization? Facing extreme insecurity, Latin American democracies increasingly deploy soldiers for policing and operate police like soldiers. This trend risks undermining democratic governance in multiple respects (e.g., fueling human rights violations). However, civilians reportedly have few incentives and capabilities to control militarization by concluding troop deployments and reducing police violence.It therefore is puzzling that a coalition emerged to monitor the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, wherein the Brazilian Army controlled local policing. Moreover, the Intervention and preceding military operations in Rio de Janeiro were discontinued from 2019 to 2022. The Intervention saw considerably more police violence than prior military operations, which surprisingly had corresponded with fewer extrajudicial killings than non-deployment periods.To illuminate these puzzles, I argue that the autonomy paradox explains institutions' formation and impacts. Independence from militarization's principal and agents gives civilians the opportunity to establish institutions to contest militarization. Because autonomy limits their access to information, institutions must collect original information to monitor militarization. Such information could enable them to shape political discourse (by influencing critical media coverage) and, thus, military officials' concerns with deployments' legitimacy (by raising societal costs), potentially contributing to military lobbying against deployments.The paradox is that autonomy and its effects could limit institutions' access to military officials. Civilians thus have few opportunities to socialize officials against substituting military presence with police violence. Institutions could raise militarization's cost, potentially cannot facilitate demilitarization necessarily, and could have the unintended consequence of intensifying violence. Overcoming the paradox could require balancing independence and collaboration to increase socialization opportunities.I develop this argument by synthesizing theory on controlling the military and controlling militarization. The former entails monitoring the military to raise societal costs of disobeying civilian authority and socializing officials into considering this authority legitimate. The latter involves using political discourse to delegitimize military force. A theory-building case study advances the argument. Through process-tracing based on 119 interviews and several original datasets, I analyze whether autonomy was necessary and/or sufficient for institutions to form, monitor, and influence the Federal Intervention.
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