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Decriminalizing Crime: Retribution W...

Byas, Jason Lee,

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Decriminalizing Crime: Retribution Without the Retributive Ritual /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Decriminalizing Crime: Retribution Without the Retributive Ritual // Jason Lee Byas.
Author:	Byas, Jason Lee,
Description:	1 electronic resource (123 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-07, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International87-07A.
Subject:	Law. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=32477068
ISBN:	9798273310841

Decriminalizing Crime: Retribution Without the Retributive Ritual /
Byas, Jason Lee,

Decriminalizing Crime: Retribution Without the Retributive Ritual /Jason Lee Byas. - 1 electronic resource (123 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-07, Section: A.

When someone has clearly committed egregious wrongdoing and they either go unpunished, or are very lightly punished, this provokes in us a sense of outrage. This provides a simple, yet compelling argument for retributivists, who believe there is something morally important about punishment regardless of whether it provides further social benefit, and a simple, yet compelling problem for abolitionists who reject punishment as unjust. The aim of this dissertation is to provide a very complicated answer to this simple argument. The short version of that answer is as follows: it is morally significant, independent of further social benefit, to condemn wrongdoing and vindicate victims, which is a role currently served by punishment. Yet this purpose does not necessarily depend on punishment in particular, and it is a live question whether it could be adequately or even better served by abolitionist alternatives to the criminal law, such as expanding tort restitution and restorative justice. Our outrage in cases of non-punishment, then, is outrage towards the failure to hold someone accountable, given our socially contingent system of accountability. The more conservative version of my conclusion is thus that retributivism requires substantive criminological inquiry to justify punishment; the less conservative version is that the abolitionist rejection of punishment is compatible with the basic retributivist intuition. I begin with an introduction that explains the basic question in greater detail, while also explaining my own motivations in wanting to answer it. Then, in the first substantive chapter, "A Dilemma for Desertism," I argue against the version of retributivism that says wrongdoers simply deserve to suffer by arguing that this sense of desert is either morally objectionable or reduces to mere shorthand for other moral concerns. In the second chapter, "Systems of Social Worth," I reconstruct a version of the expressive retributivist framework that seems correct: on this picture, we must condemn wrongdoing and vindicate victims in order to socially realize the value of victims. This social realization, I argue, ends up being protection within a shared set of stable social norms, and this task, I further argue, could in principle be satisfied by something other than punishment. Part of this depends on whether alternatives could meaningfully count as condemnation, and whether something expresses a given value judgment is partly a matter of convention. Thus, the third chapter, "The Vocabulary of Society" turns to the question of how we can judge which conceivable modes of expression are feasible and fitting. With respect to fit, my answer ends up being that a mode of expression is more fitting to the extent that it is the one you would choose if you sincerely cared about the values in question. In the case of condemning egregious wrongdoing, this will partly depend on what actually reduces the incidence of that wrongdoing, and so substantive criminological inquiry should matter for the expressive retributivist, even if it does not matter in the same way that it does for the straightforward penal consequentialist. The conclusion, "Retribution: An Abolitionist Translation," then returns to the cases motivating simple retributivist intuition, and shows how the machinery of the three core chapters helps to "translate" that intuition into something more amenable to the abolitionist.

English

ISBN: 9798273310841Subjects--Topical Terms:

600858
Law.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Punishment

Decriminalizing Crime: Retribution Without the Retributive Ritual /
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500 $a Advisors: Anderson, Elizabeth S. Committee members: Mendlow, Gabriel; Jørgensen, Renée; Sussman, David.
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520 $a When someone has clearly committed egregious wrongdoing and they either go unpunished, or are very lightly punished, this provokes in us a sense of outrage. This provides a simple, yet compelling argument for retributivists, who believe there is something morally important about punishment regardless of whether it provides further social benefit, and a simple, yet compelling problem for abolitionists who reject punishment as unjust. The aim of this dissertation is to provide a very complicated answer to this simple argument. The short version of that answer is as follows: it is morally significant, independent of further social benefit, to condemn wrongdoing and vindicate victims, which is a role currently served by punishment. Yet this purpose does not necessarily depend on punishment in particular, and it is a live question whether it could be adequately or even better served by abolitionist alternatives to the criminal law, such as expanding tort restitution and restorative justice. Our outrage in cases of non-punishment, then, is outrage towards the failure to hold someone accountable, given our socially contingent system of accountability. The more conservative version of my conclusion is thus that retributivism requires substantive criminological inquiry to justify punishment; the less conservative version is that the abolitionist rejection of punishment is compatible with the basic retributivist intuition. I begin with an introduction that explains the basic question in greater detail, while also explaining my own motivations in wanting to answer it. Then, in the first substantive chapter, "A Dilemma for Desertism," I argue against the version of retributivism that says wrongdoers simply deserve to suffer by arguing that this sense of desert is either morally objectionable or reduces to mere shorthand for other moral concerns. In the second chapter, "Systems of Social Worth," I reconstruct a version of the expressive retributivist framework that seems correct: on this picture, we must condemn wrongdoing and vindicate victims in order to socially realize the value of victims. This social realization, I argue, ends up being protection within a shared set of stable social norms, and this task, I further argue, could in principle be satisfied by something other than punishment. Part of this depends on whether alternatives could meaningfully count as condemnation, and whether something expresses a given value judgment is partly a matter of convention. Thus, the third chapter, "The Vocabulary of Society" turns to the question of how we can judge which conceivable modes of expression are feasible and fitting. With respect to fit, my answer ends up being that a mode of expression is more fitting to the extent that it is the one you would choose if you sincerely cared about the values in question. In the case of condemning egregious wrongdoing, this will partly depend on what actually reduces the incidence of that wrongdoing, and so substantive criminological inquiry should matter for the expressive retributivist, even if it does not matter in the same way that it does for the straightforward penal consequentialist. The conclusion, "Retribution: An Abolitionist Translation," then returns to the cases motivating simple retributivist intuition, and shows how the machinery of the three core chapters helps to "translate" that intuition into something more amenable to the abolitionist.
546 $a English
590 $a School code: 0127
650 4 $a Law. $3 600858
650 4 $a Law enforcement. $3 607408
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Criminology. $3 533274
653 $a Punishment
653 $a Retribution
653 $a Philosophy of law
653 $a Prison abolition
653 $a Retributivism
653 $a Criminal justice
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0398
690 $a 0206
690 $a 0627
710 2 $a University of Michigan. $b Philosophy. $e degree granting institution. $3 3814657
720 1 $a Anderson, Elizabeth S. $e degree supervisor.
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 87-07A.
790 $a 0127
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2025
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=32477068