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Auction theory = introductory exercises with answer keys /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Auction theory/ by Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia.
其他題名:	introductory exercises with answer keys /
作者:	Choi, Pak-Sing.
其他作者:	Munoz-Garcia, Felix.
出版者:	Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland : : 2025.,
面頁冊數:	xv, 370 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	Chapter1: Second Price Auctions -- Chapter2:First Price Auctions -- Chapter3: First Price Auctions Extensions -- Chapter4: All Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders -- Chapter5: Third Price Auctions kth Price Auctions and Lotteries -- Chapter6: The Revenue Equivalence Principle -- Chapter7: Common Value Auctions -- Chapter8: Multi Unit Auctions -- Chapter9: Mechanism Design -- Chapter10: Procurement Auctions.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Auction theory - Problems, exercises, etc. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-93271-7
ISBN:	9783031932717

Auction theory = introductory exercises with answer keys /
Choi, Pak-Sing.

Auction theoryintroductory exercises with answer keys /[electronic resource] :by Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia. - Second edition. - Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2025. - xv, 370 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ;24 cm. - Springer texts in business and economics,2192-4341. - Springer texts in business and economics..

Chapter1: Second Price Auctions -- Chapter2:First Price Auctions -- Chapter3: First Price Auctions Extensions -- Chapter4: All Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders -- Chapter5: Third Price Auctions kth Price Auctions and Lotteries -- Chapter6: The Revenue Equivalence Principle -- Chapter7: Common Value Auctions -- Chapter8: Multi Unit Auctions -- Chapter9: Mechanism Design -- Chapter10: Procurement Auctions.

This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 98 exercises that predict bidders' equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller's strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Revised and updated for the second edition, this textbook includes new and expanded exercises as well as a mathematical appendix to help students review basic math and statistical properties frequently used throughout the book. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, it is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.

ISBN: 9783031932717

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-93271-7doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

3495643
Auction theory
--Problems, exercises, etc.

LC Class. No.: HB172

Dewey Class. No.: 338.5

Auction theory = introductory exercises with answer keys /
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520 $a This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 98 exercises that predict bidders' equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller's strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Revised and updated for the second edition, this textbook includes new and expanded exercises as well as a mathematical appendix to help students review basic math and statistical properties frequently used throughout the book. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, it is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
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