東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Budgeting and Psychological Motivati...

Waiser, Rob.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management./
作者:	Waiser, Rob.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
面頁冊數:	102 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International79-01A.
標題:	Research. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10190110
ISBN:	9781369854053

Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management.
Waiser, Rob.

Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 102 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2016.

Sales force incentives are used to motivate, control, and reward salespeople, and represent a substantial expenditure for many firms. In this dissertation, I examine the role that sales managers play in setting budgets for sales force incentives and I investigate how public recognition of performance in sales contests (a common form of incentive) affects salespeople's motivations. The standard analytical models used in the literature on sales force incentives consist of a firm and a salesperson, with sales managers assumed (often implicitly) to be interchangeable with the firm. In my first study, I treat sales managers as distinct from their firms, in both their objectives and their information. I use this model to explore why many firms allow managers to participate in setting budgets for their salespeople's incentives despite the apparent conflict of interest that results. I show that allowing such participation can be beneficial when it reveals useful information about the manager's salesperson or their territory. I then propose a budget-setting approach that reveals such information and identify the conditions under which it is feasible and optimal. In my next study, I consider alternative solutions to the challenge of revealing a sales manager's private information about her salespeople or territories. In particular, I examine how the manager's own compensation can be designed for this purpose. This can be achieved by offering the manager a menu of contracts, each consisting of a compensation plan for the manager and a budget constraint within which the manager must design the salesperson's compensation plan. In my final study, a joint work with Tanjim Hossain and Mengze Shi, I use a combination of analytical modeling and laboratory experiments to investigate how a salesperson's psychological motivations re affected by the design of a sales contest. I am primarily interested in the public disclosure of contest results, such as the names and/or ranks of winners and losers. I find that recognizing winners generates positive psychological motivations, but that the relative performance of particular disclosure approaches can depend on the contest prize structure.

ISBN: 9781369854053Subjects--Topical Terms:

531893
Research.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Budgeting

Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management.
LDR:03473nmm a2200421 4500 001 2402696
005 20241104055632.5
006 m o d
007 cr#unu||||||||
008 251215s2016 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781369854053
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10190110
035 $a (MiAaPQ)toronto:14062
035 $a AAI10190110
035 $a 2402696
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Waiser, Rob. $3 3772939
245 1 0 $a Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2016
300 $a 102 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Shi, Mengze.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2016.
520 $a Sales force incentives are used to motivate, control, and reward salespeople, and represent a substantial expenditure for many firms. In this dissertation, I examine the role that sales managers play in setting budgets for sales force incentives and I investigate how public recognition of performance in sales contests (a common form of incentive) affects salespeople's motivations. The standard analytical models used in the literature on sales force incentives consist of a firm and a salesperson, with sales managers assumed (often implicitly) to be interchangeable with the firm. In my first study, I treat sales managers as distinct from their firms, in both their objectives and their information. I use this model to explore why many firms allow managers to participate in setting budgets for their salespeople's incentives despite the apparent conflict of interest that results. I show that allowing such participation can be beneficial when it reveals useful information about the manager's salesperson or their territory. I then propose a budget-setting approach that reveals such information and identify the conditions under which it is feasible and optimal. In my next study, I consider alternative solutions to the challenge of revealing a sales manager's private information about her salespeople or territories. In particular, I examine how the manager's own compensation can be designed for this purpose. This can be achieved by offering the manager a menu of contracts, each consisting of a compensation plan for the manager and a budget constraint within which the manager must design the salesperson's compensation plan. In my final study, a joint work with Tanjim Hossain and Mengze Shi, I use a combination of analytical modeling and laboratory experiments to investigate how a salesperson's psychological motivations re affected by the design of a sales contest. I am primarily interested in the public disclosure of contest results, such as the names and/or ranks of winners and losers. I find that recognizing winners generates positive psychological motivations, but that the relative performance of particular disclosure approaches can depend on the contest prize structure.
590 $a School code: 0779.
650 4 $a Research. $3 531893
650 4 $a Motivation. $3 532704
650 4 $a Managers. $2 gtt $3 1457937
650 4 $a Experiments. $3 525909
650 4 $a Participation. $3 1555180
650 4 $a Dissertations & theses. $3 3560115
650 4 $a Literature reviews. $3 3559998
653 $a Budgeting
653 $a Lobbying
653 $a Recognition programs
653 $a Sales contests
653 $a Sales force compensation
653 $a Sales management
690 $a 0338
690 $a 0454
710 2 $a University of Toronto (Canada). $b Management. $3 2102915
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 79-01A.
790 $a 0779
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2016
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10190110