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Strategic Repression of Political Di...

Winns, Desiree.

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Strategic Repression of Political Dissidents in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Belarus.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Strategic Repression of Political Dissidents in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Belarus./
Author:	Winns, Desiree.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2024,
Description:	72 p.
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International85-11.
Subject:	Russian history. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31239195
ISBN:	9798382768366

Strategic Repression of Political Dissidents in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Belarus.
Winns, Desiree.

Strategic Repression of Political Dissidents in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Belarus. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024 - 72 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11.

Thesis (M.A.)--The George Washington University, 2024.

This thesis explores the decision calculus behind individual level repressions in Russia and Belarus. Specifically focusing on case studies of political figures, journalists and civilians/activists, the research determines that Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko wait to kill individuals who resist their regimes to take advantage of other forms of repression, such as imprisonment or exile. To discourage elite betrayal, which is a greater threat to both authoritarians, former inner circle members face more gruesome forms of repression, while oppositional figures only become bigger threats once they possess information, resources, or connections that are equivalent to that of an inner circle member. Bureaucratic enthusiasm amongst security circles in Russia and Belarus also contributes to the targeting of individuals, whether to impress supervisors, unleash personal grudges, or create "preventative" measures. Since death can only be used once against a dissident, authoritarians wait for moments and methods that will best project an intended message to international or domestic watchers. Finally, the political paranoia of betrayal, inherited from the Soviet Union, is prevalent in the pursuit and prosecution of traitors. However, in Russia and Belarus, betrayal is perceived as any action taken by any person who speaks for or represents an alternative to the regime.

ISBN: 9798382768366Subjects--Topical Terms:

3173845
Russian history.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Belarus

Strategic Repression of Political Dissidents in Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Belarus.
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520 $a This thesis explores the decision calculus behind individual level repressions in Russia and Belarus. Specifically focusing on case studies of political figures, journalists and civilians/activists, the research determines that Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko wait to kill individuals who resist their regimes to take advantage of other forms of repression, such as imprisonment or exile. To discourage elite betrayal, which is a greater threat to both authoritarians, former inner circle members face more gruesome forms of repression, while oppositional figures only become bigger threats once they possess information, resources, or connections that are equivalent to that of an inner circle member. Bureaucratic enthusiasm amongst security circles in Russia and Belarus also contributes to the targeting of individuals, whether to impress supervisors, unleash personal grudges, or create "preventative" measures. Since death can only be used once against a dissident, authoritarians wait for moments and methods that will best project an intended message to international or domestic watchers. Finally, the political paranoia of betrayal, inherited from the Soviet Union, is prevalent in the pursuit and prosecution of traitors. However, in Russia and Belarus, betrayal is perceived as any action taken by any person who speaks for or represents an alternative to the regime.
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653 $a Repression
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