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Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker: Effects...

Yao, Ting.

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Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker: Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker: Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards./
作者:	Yao, Ting.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	129 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-04A.
標題:	Business administration. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13901698
ISBN:	9781088312254

Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker: Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards.
Yao, Ting.

Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker: Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 129 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2019.

The venture capital (VC) business model significantly affects the startup companies they back financially. This study explores a phenomenon that is closely related to the VC business model and fund structure-VC-led time horizon differences among board members. VC-led time horizon differences are where directors are misaligned in terms of their preferred exit times. Since VC funds have a fixed lifetime, this finite horizon causes strong exit pressure toward the end of the fund's lifespan. Although entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have similar long-term time horizons at the outset of the relationship, factors such as entrepreneurs' aggressive goal-setting, time-bound VC funds, and the uncertain entrepreneurial process can shift the synchronous time horizons initially shared by the entrepreneur and the venture capitalists. This dissertation investigates three questions: 1) Why and how often do VC-led time horizon differences arise? 2) How do VC-led time horizon differences affect board dynamics and exit outcomes? and 3) How can startups effectively manage VC-led time horizon differences? The focus of this analysis is on the board of directors, whose members are the most important people in deciding exit strategies, whether through an initial public offering (IPO), merger and acquisition (M&A), or bankruptcy.I conducted a field study to understand the origin of VC-led time horizon differences and their impact on board dynamics. I further tested the impact of VC-led time horizon differences on low-valued exits using a hand-collected dataset of U.S. VC-backed surgical device startups. The findings show that VC-led time horizon differences significantly increase the chance of bankruptcy and low-valued M&As. More importantly, the results of the systematic quantitative analysis suggest how to effectively manage VC-led time horizon differences by selecting certain types of directors (i.e., serial-entrepreneur independent directors, experienced VC directors, and by avoiding investor-executives) as well as the importance of carefully managing stage improvement when facing VC-led time horizon differences. This research contributes to the extant literature on corporate governance, VC management, entrepreneurship, and time perception. The findings have important practical implications for entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and policymakers.

ISBN: 9781088312254Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168311
Business administration.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Venture capital

Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker: Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards.
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