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Perceiving the Essence: A Husserlian...

Clemons, Matthew.

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Perceiving the Essence: A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Perceiving the Essence: A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction./
作者:	Clemons, Matthew.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2023,
面頁冊數:	235 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-12B.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30422996
ISBN:	9798379736156

Perceiving the Essence: A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction.
Clemons, Matthew.

Perceiving the Essence: A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023 - 235 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2023.

This dissertation takes up a philosophical problem-or better yet a direction-found in Aristotle's Metaphysics book IV (Γ) and explicates, clarifies, and enriches it in and through Husserl's work. Book IV is in large part a defense of the legitimacy of the principle of noncontradiction (PNC). In defense of the principle, Aristotle encounters skeptical objections of two kinds. The first is of Heracleitean origin. Since, according to the Heracleitean, all things are constantly changing, the requisite determinacy required for the principle of noncontradiction to hold is missing. Against the Heracleitean, Aristotle points to the metaphysical doctrine of essence as entelechy, that which remains the same in and through change, as the ground of the principle of non-contradiction. The second kind of skeptical objection that Aristotle encounters issues from the Protagorean camp, is epistemologically motivated, and targets the contention that it is impossible to believe a contradiction. Because the principle of non-contradiction cannot be demonstrated without already assuming the principle, Aristotle resorts to a "demonstration by refutation," the rules of which the Protagorean constantly disregards. Aristotle is not, however, without a response even for the most obstinate of interlocutors. He first attempts a transcendental argument of sorts, emphasizing that essences are the condition for the possibility of perception and action, which the Protagorean cannot do without. This argument ultimately fails in that it remains vulnerable to the critique that there is a distinction between what appears to us and what is. I argue that Aristotle hints at a rebuttal, arguing that essences are, in fact, given in perception, although he does not fill his account out. For that, I turn to Husserl, first indicating how his understanding of motivated possibility and his eidetic method point beyond the being/appearance distinction that transcendental arguments suffer from. I then use Husserl's own account of perception to clarify Aristotle's seemingly contradictory contention that perception is at once a kind of flux and gives the essence indirectly. Finally, I follow Husserl in his eidetic-genetic investigations, showing how the essence is, in fact, given.

ISBN: 9798379736156Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Metaphysics book IV

Perceiving the Essence: A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction.
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