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The Strategic Versus the Neo-Ideolog...

Palcu-Johnston, Liam.

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The Strategic Versus the Neo-Ideological Model: What Explains Mass Killing?

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Strategic Versus the Neo-Ideological Model: What Explains Mass Killing?/
作者:	Palcu-Johnston, Liam.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2023,
面頁冊數:	91 p.
附註:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 85-05.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International85-05.
標題:	Power. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30718316
ISBN:	9798380707411

The Strategic Versus the Neo-Ideological Model: What Explains Mass Killing?
Palcu-Johnston, Liam.

The Strategic Versus the Neo-Ideological Model: What Explains Mass Killing? - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023 - 91 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 85-05.

Thesis (M.A.)--McGill University (Canada), 2023.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

My thesis explores what causes government elites/leaders to commit mass killing by building on, refining, and challenging assumptions of the strategic model. The model argues that mass killing is a rational top-down instrumental policy utilized by leaders to combat threats to their power. Consequently, mass killing is strongly correlated with elite power being challenged, such as assassinations, wars, and coups. Although this model has the most academic support, it has three notable limitations: the domination-vulnerability paradox, the leap of imagination issue, and the disparity problem.To address these limitations, I utilize research that explores psychological and ideological factors that impact how elites determine their strategic interests, establish an outgroup in its entirety as a significant threat, and justify extreme behaviour. I conclude that although ideologies on their own do not explain mass killing, the interactive relationship between threats to elite power and exclusionary beliefs does.To test my theory I use logistic regression and rare-events logit models with panel data that compiles information on 158 countries between 1955 and 2011. I examine the interactive relationship between exclusionary beliefs and different types of threats to elite power. Additionally, I control for the potential effects of government military strength, regime type, media freedom, the post-cold war period, previous instances of mass killing, population size, gross domestic product per capita, and ethnic fractionalization. I discover that the interaction between threats to elite interest and exclusionary beliefs does not increase the probability of mass violence, suggesting that these ideologies do not significantly influence how leaders interpret challenges to their power. However, I find that exclusionary beliefs and symmetrical war rather than guerrilla warfare are strongly associated with mass killing, which challenges certain fundamental assumptions of the strategic model.

ISBN: 9798380707411Subjects--Topical Terms:

518736
Power.

The Strategic Versus the Neo-Ideological Model: What Explains Mass Killing?
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500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 85-05.
500 $a Advisor: Pelc, Krzysztof.
502 $a Thesis (M.A.)--McGill University (Canada), 2023.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a My thesis explores what causes government elites/leaders to commit mass killing by building on, refining, and challenging assumptions of the strategic model. The model argues that mass killing is a rational top-down instrumental policy utilized by leaders to combat threats to their power. Consequently, mass killing is strongly correlated with elite power being challenged, such as assassinations, wars, and coups. Although this model has the most academic support, it has three notable limitations: the domination-vulnerability paradox, the leap of imagination issue, and the disparity problem.To address these limitations, I utilize research that explores psychological and ideological factors that impact how elites determine their strategic interests, establish an outgroup in its entirety as a significant threat, and justify extreme behaviour. I conclude that although ideologies on their own do not explain mass killing, the interactive relationship between threats to elite power and exclusionary beliefs does.To test my theory I use logistic regression and rare-events logit models with panel data that compiles information on 158 countries between 1955 and 2011. I examine the interactive relationship between exclusionary beliefs and different types of threats to elite power. Additionally, I control for the potential effects of government military strength, regime type, media freedom, the post-cold war period, previous instances of mass killing, population size, gross domestic product per capita, and ethnic fractionalization. I discover that the interaction between threats to elite interest and exclusionary beliefs does not increase the probability of mass violence, suggesting that these ideologies do not significantly influence how leaders interpret challenges to their power. However, I find that exclusionary beliefs and symmetrical war rather than guerrilla warfare are strongly associated with mass killing, which challenges certain fundamental assumptions of the strategic model.
520 $a Ma these a pour objectif de cerner les raisons qui incitent les elites/leaders gouvernementaux a perpetrer des massacres en s'appuyant sur les hypotheses du modele strategique, en cherchant a les affiner et a les soumettre a rude epreuve. Le modele stipule que le massacre fait partie d'une politique instrumentale descendante rationnelle utilisee par les dirigeants pour combattre les menaces a leur pouvoir. Par consequent, les massacres presentent une forte correlation avec la remise en cause du pouvoir des elites, comme les assassinats, les guerres et les coups d'Etat. Si cette theorie jouit du plus grand soutien academique, elle presente trois limites notables : le paradoxe domination-vulnerabilite, la problematique du saut dans l'imagination et la question de la disparite.En vue de combler ces lacunes, je m'appuie sur des recherches qui explorent les facteurs psychologiques et ideologiques ayant un impact sur le processus par lequel les elites definissent leurs interets strategiques, etablissent un groupe externe dans sa globalite a titre de menace importante, et justifient un comportement extreme. Je conclus que, bien que les ideologies en elles-memes ne parviennent pas a expliquer les massacres, la relation interactive entre les menaces pour le pouvoir des elites et les croyances d'exclusion le permet.Dans cette optique, je fais appel a des modeles de regression logistique et de logit a evenements rares a partir de donnees de panel qui compilent des informations sur 158 pays entre 1955 et 2011. J'examine la relation interactive existant entre les croyances d'exclusion et differents types de menaces pour le pouvoir des elites. Par ailleurs, je prends en compte les effets potentiels de la puissance militaire du gouvernement, du type de regime, de la liberte des medias, de la periode d'apres-guerre froide, des precedents massacres, de la taille de la population, du produit interieur brut par habitant et de la segmentation ethnique. Je decouvre que l'interaction entre les menaces pour les interets de l'elite et les croyances d'exclusion ne donne pas lieu a une hausse de la probabilite de violence de masse, ce qui suggere que ces ideologies n'influencent pas de maniere significative la facon dont les dirigeants interpretent les defis a leur pouvoir. En revanche, je constate que les croyances d'exclusion et la guerre symetrique plutot que la guerilla apparaissent fortement associees aux massacres, ce qui remet en cause certaines hypotheses fondamentales du modele strategique.
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