東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

The Domestic Politics of Defense in ...

Matchett, Leah.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

The Domestic Politics of Defense in the U.S. Congress.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Domestic Politics of Defense in the U.S. Congress./
作者:	Matchett, Leah.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2023,
面頁冊數:	342 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-04, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-04A.
標題:	Archives & records. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30615074
ISBN:	9798380481458

The Domestic Politics of Defense in the U.S. Congress.
Matchett, Leah.

The Domestic Politics of Defense in the U.S. Congress. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023 - 342 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-04, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2023.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The US defense budget is one of the few pieces of legislation that regularly passes the US Congress, but current scholarship in American politics and US foreign policy struggle to explain precisely why this happens. Existing theories of Congressional behavior that explain other issue areas- like the influence of a member's districts or his or her personal history- have a history of null results when applied to defense votes. My dissertation addresses the question of why the US defense budget is so popular in Congress, and how this varies across members and time. I decompose support for the defense budget into a member's engagement, or work on this issue, and their voting record, and show that existing theories explain well members' engagement- members with military industry in their district tend to work on defense issues more than other members- but does not explain a members' vote pattern. This is largely because of the large number of unengaged congressmembers who vote in favor of defense bills despite not having these characteristics. I suggest that this occurs because members of Congress are concerned about the domestic political consequences of being labeled soft on defense, and engage in strategic voting in support of defense, particularly in times of national threat. I use survey experiments and 80 years of Congressional behavior to support this claim. My final paper compares two instances in which soft on defense criticism were used to change the politics of missile defense and demonstrates how a perception of threat in Congress is a precondition for this effect.

ISBN: 9798380481458Subjects--Topical Terms:

3558980
Archives & records.

The Domestic Politics of Defense in the U.S. Congress.
LDR:02741nmm a2200349 4500 001 2395066
005 20240513060812.5
006 m o d
007 cr#unu||||||||
008 251215s2023 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798380481458
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI30615074
035 $a (MiAaPQ)STANFORDst060vr1951
035 $a AAI30615074
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Matchett, Leah. $3 3764564
245 1 0 $a The Domestic Politics of Defense in the U.S. Congress.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2023
300 $a 342 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-04, Section: A.
500 $a Includes supplementary digital materials.
500 $a Advisor: Sagan, Scott;Grimmer, Justin;Schultz, Kenneth.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2023.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a The US defense budget is one of the few pieces of legislation that regularly passes the US Congress, but current scholarship in American politics and US foreign policy struggle to explain precisely why this happens. Existing theories of Congressional behavior that explain other issue areas- like the influence of a member's districts or his or her personal history- have a history of null results when applied to defense votes. My dissertation addresses the question of why the US defense budget is so popular in Congress, and how this varies across members and time. I decompose support for the defense budget into a member's engagement, or work on this issue, and their voting record, and show that existing theories explain well members' engagement- members with military industry in their district tend to work on defense issues more than other members- but does not explain a members' vote pattern. This is largely because of the large number of unengaged congressmembers who vote in favor of defense bills despite not having these characteristics. I suggest that this occurs because members of Congress are concerned about the domestic political consequences of being labeled soft on defense, and engage in strategic voting in support of defense, particularly in times of national threat. I use survey experiments and 80 years of Congressional behavior to support this claim. My final paper compares two instances in which soft on defense criticism were used to change the politics of missile defense and demonstrates how a perception of threat in Congress is a precondition for this effect.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Archives & records. $3 3558980
650 4 $a Military policy. $3 753758
650 4 $a Authorizations. $3 3764565
650 4 $a Defense contracts. $3 3764566
650 4 $a Defense spending. $3 3680435
650 4 $a Military studies. $3 2197382
650 4 $a Public policy. $3 532803
690 $a 0750
690 $a 0630
710 2 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 85-04A.
790 $a 0212
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2023
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30615074