東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays on Insider Trading, Innovatio...

Chen, Jiawei.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays on Insider Trading, Innovation, and Political Economy.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Insider Trading, Innovation, and Political Economy./
作者:	Chen, Jiawei.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2022,
面頁冊數:	143 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-02A.
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29319998
ISBN:	9798841765226

Essays on Insider Trading, Innovation, and Political Economy.
Chen, Jiawei.

Essays on Insider Trading, Innovation, and Political Economy. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2022 - 143 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Mississippi State University, 2022.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

I study how insider trading interacts with the political economy, regulators and other corporate governance mechanisms. In the first section, I examine the impact of insider trading restriction enforcement on firm innovation. U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions are intended to protect investors and limit expropriation by firm insiders, but enforcement could impact insiders' incentives to contribute to value enhancing activities. Therefore, I explore how corporate innovation and performance respond to insider trading restrictions imposed by firms and regulators. Using manually collected data on SEC indictments against corporate insiders, I document more innovative activity following external insider trading restrictions. External restrictions are also followed by higher corporate investment, capital access, and operating performance. Similarly, internal blackout restrictions to insider trading are also linked to more patents. SEC and congressional rule changes serve as quasi-natural experiments resulting in shocks in enforcement and indictments for identification and inference. Overall, the results suggest insider trading restrictions and enforcement actions impact subsequent firm activities and managerial decisions by protecting outside investment, resulting in more investment and innovation. In the second section, I explore the relation between political uncertainty and insider trading. With political uncertainty elevated recently, I examine the role of political uncertainty among insiders. By measuring firm-specific political risk measured from conference calls, I observe insiders trade more actively during uncertain periods with trading volume and transaction value increasing alongside political uncertainty. The results are driven by non-routine insider transactions and purchases at firms with CEO duality and fewer insider trading restrictions. Next, I observe similar results when exploiting variation in election timing across states and alternative external measures. Moreover, I find evidence of informed insider trading by observing higher abnormal returns following insider trades amidst political uncertainty. Finally, I find political uncertainty is linked to lower bid-ask spreads and leverage but observe higher outstanding shares with more insider trading when experiencing positive political uncertainty, consistent with insiders informing markets and improving liquidity. Overall, these results suggest insiders purchase more actively and opportunistically amidst political uncertainty, improving market information quality, especially when internal governance is accommodating.

ISBN: 9798841765226Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Innovation

Essays on Insider Trading, Innovation, and Political Economy.
LDR:03817nmm a2200373 4500 001 2394368
005 20240422070838.5
006 m o d
007 cr#unu||||||||
008 251215s2022 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798841765226
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI29319998
035 $a AAI29319998
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Chen, Jiawei. $3 1909659
245 1 0 $a Essays on Insider Trading, Innovation, and Political Economy.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2022
300 $a 143 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-02, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Blank, Douglas Brian, II.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Mississippi State University, 2022.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a I study how insider trading interacts with the political economy, regulators and other corporate governance mechanisms. In the first section, I examine the impact of insider trading restriction enforcement on firm innovation. U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions are intended to protect investors and limit expropriation by firm insiders, but enforcement could impact insiders' incentives to contribute to value enhancing activities. Therefore, I explore how corporate innovation and performance respond to insider trading restrictions imposed by firms and regulators. Using manually collected data on SEC indictments against corporate insiders, I document more innovative activity following external insider trading restrictions. External restrictions are also followed by higher corporate investment, capital access, and operating performance. Similarly, internal blackout restrictions to insider trading are also linked to more patents. SEC and congressional rule changes serve as quasi-natural experiments resulting in shocks in enforcement and indictments for identification and inference. Overall, the results suggest insider trading restrictions and enforcement actions impact subsequent firm activities and managerial decisions by protecting outside investment, resulting in more investment and innovation. In the second section, I explore the relation between political uncertainty and insider trading. With political uncertainty elevated recently, I examine the role of political uncertainty among insiders. By measuring firm-specific political risk measured from conference calls, I observe insiders trade more actively during uncertain periods with trading volume and transaction value increasing alongside political uncertainty. The results are driven by non-routine insider transactions and purchases at firms with CEO duality and fewer insider trading restrictions. Next, I observe similar results when exploiting variation in election timing across states and alternative external measures. Moreover, I find evidence of informed insider trading by observing higher abnormal returns following insider trades amidst political uncertainty. Finally, I find political uncertainty is linked to lower bid-ask spreads and leverage but observe higher outstanding shares with more insider trading when experiencing positive political uncertainty, consistent with insiders informing markets and improving liquidity. Overall, these results suggest insiders purchase more actively and opportunistically amidst political uncertainty, improving market information quality, especially when internal governance is accommodating.
590 $a School code: 0132.
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
653 $a Innovation
653 $a Insider trading
653 $a Political uncertainty
653 $a U. S. Securities
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a Mississippi State University. $b Finance and Economics. $3 3189137
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 84-02A.
790 $a 0132
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2022
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29319998