東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

David versus Goliath: The Power of W...

Petaludis, Nicholas K.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

David versus Goliath: The Power of Weakness in Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons from History.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	David versus Goliath: The Power of Weakness in Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons from History./
Author:	Petaludis, Nicholas K.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2023,
Description:	417 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-07, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-07A.
Subject:	Military studies. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30244117
ISBN:	9798368447353

David versus Goliath: The Power of Weakness in Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons from History.
Petaludis, Nicholas K.

David versus Goliath: The Power of Weakness in Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons from History. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023 - 417 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-07, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2023.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Under what conditions do violent nonstate actors (VNA) succeed against states? Why does David sometimes beat Goliath? Since at least the time of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian Wars, the realist narrative in international relations measures power primarily in relative, coercive, and deterrent terms. Strong states should accordingly face fewer constraints and enjoy more options while pursuing their national interests. Unconventional warfare, and its subsets of terrorism and insurgency, should-given these circumstances, end in VNA failure. Sometimes, however, VNAs find success. By comparing the literature on historical and current case studies, I propose that a set of preconditions and two mechanisms help explain "the power of weakness." After it decides to abandon peaceful conflict resolution, the weak side must cultivate the cause that inspires its members to kill and die, to torture and suffer. Next, it requires safe havens. If the VNA cannot avoid the state's reach, its initial wave of attacks may likely constitute its final wave of attacks. Inspiration and sanctuary thus provide the weak side enough space and time for a stalemate. The state's daunting power advantages, however, make space and time necessary but not sufficient conditions for weak side success. The first mechanism that can begin to transform the existing power balance combines state miscalculation and VNA competitive adaptation. The strong side's blunders must border on the spectacular. For the weak side to survive the state's initial onslaught, it must harden its organization, coerce and cajole its community, eliminate rivals, and generate a range of goals. Although the VNA may grow and even evolve into a proto-state, it may still not achieve its political goals until external pressures intervene. My second mechanism accordingly examines how other states, international institutions, diasporas, and international norms finalize VNA success. The paradox that power does not necessarily translate to success may help clarify why states that lose unconventional conflicts often retain vast reserves of soldiers and resources. The power of weakness implies that terrorism and insurgency are forms of politics, and hence not to be understood strictly, or even primarily in military terms. Finally, the potential power of weakness can explain asymmetric warfare's persistence throughout history. Why do groups with guns and grievances, across successive generations, make the seemingly "futile" decision to fight states? A general theory of VNA success can inform analysis of when, and under what circumstances weak sides may, or may not prevail.

ISBN: 9798368447353Subjects--Topical Terms:

2197382
Military studies.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Counterinsurgency

David versus Goliath: The Power of Weakness in Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons from History.
LDR:03886nmm a2200409 4500 001 2392932
005 20231130111551.5
006 m o d
007 cr#unu||||||||
008 251215s2023 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798368447353
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI30244117
035 $a AAI30244117
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Petaludis, Nicholas K. $0 (orcid)0000-0001-7260-9147 $3 3762368
245 1 0 $a David versus Goliath: The Power of Weakness in Asymmetric Warfare: Lessons from History.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2023
300 $a 417 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-07, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Renshon, Stanley.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2023.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a Under what conditions do violent nonstate actors (VNA) succeed against states? Why does David sometimes beat Goliath? Since at least the time of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian Wars, the realist narrative in international relations measures power primarily in relative, coercive, and deterrent terms. Strong states should accordingly face fewer constraints and enjoy more options while pursuing their national interests. Unconventional warfare, and its subsets of terrorism and insurgency, should-given these circumstances, end in VNA failure. Sometimes, however, VNAs find success. By comparing the literature on historical and current case studies, I propose that a set of preconditions and two mechanisms help explain "the power of weakness." After it decides to abandon peaceful conflict resolution, the weak side must cultivate the cause that inspires its members to kill and die, to torture and suffer. Next, it requires safe havens. If the VNA cannot avoid the state's reach, its initial wave of attacks may likely constitute its final wave of attacks. Inspiration and sanctuary thus provide the weak side enough space and time for a stalemate. The state's daunting power advantages, however, make space and time necessary but not sufficient conditions for weak side success. The first mechanism that can begin to transform the existing power balance combines state miscalculation and VNA competitive adaptation. The strong side's blunders must border on the spectacular. For the weak side to survive the state's initial onslaught, it must harden its organization, coerce and cajole its community, eliminate rivals, and generate a range of goals. Although the VNA may grow and even evolve into a proto-state, it may still not achieve its political goals until external pressures intervene. My second mechanism accordingly examines how other states, international institutions, diasporas, and international norms finalize VNA success. The paradox that power does not necessarily translate to success may help clarify why states that lose unconventional conflicts often retain vast reserves of soldiers and resources. The power of weakness implies that terrorism and insurgency are forms of politics, and hence not to be understood strictly, or even primarily in military terms. Finally, the potential power of weakness can explain asymmetric warfare's persistence throughout history. Why do groups with guns and grievances, across successive generations, make the seemingly "futile" decision to fight states? A general theory of VNA success can inform analysis of when, and under what circumstances weak sides may, or may not prevail.
590 $a School code: 0046.
650 4 $a Military studies. $3 2197382
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
653 $a Counterinsurgency
653 $a Counterterrorism
653 $a Insurgency
653 $a Nonstate
653 $a Terrorism
653 $a Violence
690 $a 0750
690 $a 0601
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a City University of New York. $b Political Science. $3 1022375
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 84-07A.
790 $a 0046
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2023
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30244117