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Incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing = a game-theoretic approach /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing/ by Youqi Li ... [et al.].
Reminder of title:	a game-theoretic approach /
other author:	Li, Youqi.
Published:	Singapore :Springer Nature Singapore : : 2024.,
Description:	xi, 129 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
[NT 15003449]:	Chapter 1: A Brief Introduction -- Chapter 2: Long-term Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 3: Fair Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 4: Collaborative Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 5: Coopetition-aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 6: Summary.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Internet of things. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6921-0
ISBN:	9789819969210

Incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing = a game-theoretic approach /
Incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensinga game-theoretic approach /[electronic resource] :by Youqi Li ... [et al.]. - Singapore :Springer Nature Singapore :2024. - xi, 129 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - SpringerBriefs in computer science,2191-5776. - SpringerBriefs in computer science..

Chapter 1: A Brief Introduction -- Chapter 2: Long-term Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 3: Fair Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 4: Collaborative Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 5: Coopetition-aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 6: Summary.

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is emerging as a novel sensing paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoTs) due to the proliferation of smart devices (e.g., smartphones, wearable devices) in people's daily lives. These ubiquitous devices provide an opportunity to harness the wisdom of crowds by recruiting mobile users to collectively perform sensing tasks, which largely collect data about a wide range of human activities and the surrounding environment. However, users suffer from resource consumption such as battery, processing power, and storage, which discourages users' participation. To ensure the participation rate, it is necessary to employ an incentive mechanism to compensate users' costs such that users are willing to take part in crowdsensing. This book sheds light on the design of incentive mechanisms for MCS in the context of game theory. Particularly, this book presents several game-theoretic models for MCS in different scenarios. In Chapter 1, the authors present an overview of MCS and state the significance of incentive mechanism for MCS. Then, in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, the authors propose a long-term incentive mechanism, a fair incentive mechanism, a collaborative incentive mechanism, and a coopetition-aware incentive mechanism for MCS, respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes this book and point out the future directions. This book is of particular interest to the readers and researchers in the field of IoT research, especially in the interdisciplinary field of network economics and IoT.

ISBN: 9789819969210

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-981-99-6921-0doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

2057703
Internet of things.

LC Class. No.: TK5105.8857

Dewey Class. No.: 004.678

Incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing = a game-theoretic approach /
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505 0 $a Chapter 1: A Brief Introduction -- Chapter 2: Long-term Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 3: Fair Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 4: Collaborative Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 5: Coopetition-aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing -- Chapter 6: Summary.
520 $a Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is emerging as a novel sensing paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoTs) due to the proliferation of smart devices (e.g., smartphones, wearable devices) in people's daily lives. These ubiquitous devices provide an opportunity to harness the wisdom of crowds by recruiting mobile users to collectively perform sensing tasks, which largely collect data about a wide range of human activities and the surrounding environment. However, users suffer from resource consumption such as battery, processing power, and storage, which discourages users' participation. To ensure the participation rate, it is necessary to employ an incentive mechanism to compensate users' costs such that users are willing to take part in crowdsensing. This book sheds light on the design of incentive mechanisms for MCS in the context of game theory. Particularly, this book presents several game-theoretic models for MCS in different scenarios. In Chapter 1, the authors present an overview of MCS and state the significance of incentive mechanism for MCS. Then, in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, the authors propose a long-term incentive mechanism, a fair incentive mechanism, a collaborative incentive mechanism, and a coopetition-aware incentive mechanism for MCS, respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes this book and point out the future directions. This book is of particular interest to the readers and researchers in the field of IoT research, especially in the interdisciplinary field of network economics and IoT.
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