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Responsibility Internalism and Responsibility for AI.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Responsibility Internalism and Responsibility for AI./
作者:	Demirtas, Huzeyfe.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (146 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-12B.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30423663click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379704070

Responsibility Internalism and Responsibility for AI.
Demirtas, Huzeyfe.

Responsibility Internalism and Responsibility for AI. - 1 online resource (146 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Syracuse University, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

I argue for responsibility internalism. That is, moral responsibility (i.e., accountability, or being apt for praise or blame) depends only on factors internal to agents. Employing this view, I also argue that no one is responsible for what AI does but this isn't morally problematic in a way that counts against developing or using AI.Responsibility is grounded in three potential conditions: the control (or freedom) condition, the epistemic (or awareness) condition, and the causal responsibility condition (or consequences). I argue that causal responsibility is irrelevant for moral responsibility, and that the control condition and the epistemic condition depend only on factors internal to agents. Moreover, since what AI does is at best a consequence of our actions, and the consequences of our actions are irrelevant to our responsibility, no one is responsible for what AI does. That is, the so-called responsibility gap exits. However, this isn't morally worrisome for developing or using AI. Firstly, I argue, current AI doesn't generate a new kind of concern about responsibility that the older technologies don't. Then, I argue that responsibility gap is not worrisome because neither responsibility gap, nor my argument for its existence, entails that no one can be justly punished, held accountable, or incurs duties in reparations when AI causes a harm.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379704070Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Using AIIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Responsibility Internalism and Responsibility for AI.
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a I argue for responsibility internalism. That is, moral responsibility (i.e., accountability, or being apt for praise or blame) depends only on factors internal to agents. Employing this view, I also argue that no one is responsible for what AI does but this isn't morally problematic in a way that counts against developing or using AI.Responsibility is grounded in three potential conditions: the control (or freedom) condition, the epistemic (or awareness) condition, and the causal responsibility condition (or consequences). I argue that causal responsibility is irrelevant for moral responsibility, and that the control condition and the epistemic condition depend only on factors internal to agents. Moreover, since what AI does is at best a consequence of our actions, and the consequences of our actions are irrelevant to our responsibility, no one is responsible for what AI does. That is, the so-called responsibility gap exits. However, this isn't morally worrisome for developing or using AI. Firstly, I argue, current AI doesn't generate a new kind of concern about responsibility that the older technologies don't. Then, I argue that responsibility gap is not worrisome because neither responsibility gap, nor my argument for its existence, entails that no one can be justly punished, held accountable, or incurs duties in reparations when AI causes a harm.
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538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
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650 4 $a Epistemology. $3 896969
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