東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Empirical Studies of Auctions and Consumer Demand.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Empirical Studies of Auctions and Consumer Demand./
Author:	Guan, Junyan.
Description:	1 online resource (219 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-11B.
Subject:	Automotive engineering. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29166734click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798438775782

Empirical Studies of Auctions and Consumer Demand.
Guan, Junyan.

Empirical Studies of Auctions and Consumer Demand. - 1 online resource (219 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2022.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation consists of three chapters on empirical industrial organization. The first chapter explores how a seller uses a public reserve price to signal her private info about the object's value to the bidder. The second chapter studies how a behavioral consumer preference called "price reference effect" could overturn the standard intuition of vertical integration. The third chapter evaluates the impact of government subsidies on consumers' automobile replacement decisions in the context of cash-for-clunkers program in 2009.Chapter 1 (which is joint work with Boli Xu) considers an auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We estimate the model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find that the signaling incentive could cost the seller 4% of her profit and decrease the probability of sale by 15 percentage points. Counterfactual simulations suggest that a secret reserve price can improve both the seller's profit and probability of sale, which supports the prevalent use of secret reserve prices in practice.In many settings, behavioral economists have documented a price reference effect: the fact that a consumer's willingness to pay for a good is affected by difference between the observed price and the reference price they rationally expect. In Chapter 2 (which is joint work with Ting Wang), we show that if this price reference effect is sufficiently large, vertical integration between an upstream producer and a downstream retailer can decrease joint profits, unlike in the textbook case where vertical integration improves profits. The key intuition is that the increase in quantity is dampened when consumers update their expectations. We estimate the model using a novel dataset from a large online book retailer. Counterfactual simulations show that vertical integration would reduce joint profits by 11%.Chapter 3 investigates the impact of government subsidies on consumers' automobile replacement decisions in the context of the U.S. Car Allowance Rebate System program in 2009. I develop and estimate a dynamic discrete-choice model of automobile replacement. Results show that 65% of the households would replace their vehicles even without the subsidy. To highlight the impact of subsidy design, I show that limiting the subsidies to low-income consumers would generate 85% of the sales with half amount of total government spending. These findings emphasize the importance of balancing policy stimulus with government spending and targeting consumers more efficiently in the design of subsidy programs.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798438775782Subjects--Topical Terms:

2181195
Automotive engineering.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Empirical industrial organizationIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

Empirical Studies of Auctions and Consumer Demand.
LDR:03960nmm a2200361K 4500 001 2356737
005 20230619080101.5
006 m o d
007 cr mn ---uuuuu
008 241011s2022 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9798438775782
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI29166734
035 $a AAI29166734
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Guan, Junyan. $3 3697236
245 1 0 $a Empirical Studies of Auctions and Consumer Demand.
264 0 $c 2022
300 $a 1 online resource (219 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: Porter, Robert ; Bhattacharya, Vivek.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2022.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation consists of three chapters on empirical industrial organization. The first chapter explores how a seller uses a public reserve price to signal her private info about the object's value to the bidder. The second chapter studies how a behavioral consumer preference called "price reference effect" could overturn the standard intuition of vertical integration. The third chapter evaluates the impact of government subsidies on consumers' automobile replacement decisions in the context of cash-for-clunkers program in 2009.Chapter 1 (which is joint work with Boli Xu) considers an auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We estimate the model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find that the signaling incentive could cost the seller 4% of her profit and decrease the probability of sale by 15 percentage points. Counterfactual simulations suggest that a secret reserve price can improve both the seller's profit and probability of sale, which supports the prevalent use of secret reserve prices in practice.In many settings, behavioral economists have documented a price reference effect: the fact that a consumer's willingness to pay for a good is affected by difference between the observed price and the reference price they rationally expect. In Chapter 2 (which is joint work with Ting Wang), we show that if this price reference effect is sufficiently large, vertical integration between an upstream producer and a downstream retailer can decrease joint profits, unlike in the textbook case where vertical integration improves profits. The key intuition is that the increase in quantity is dampened when consumers update their expectations. We estimate the model using a novel dataset from a large online book retailer. Counterfactual simulations show that vertical integration would reduce joint profits by 11%.Chapter 3 investigates the impact of government subsidies on consumers' automobile replacement decisions in the context of the U.S. Car Allowance Rebate System program in 2009. I develop and estimate a dynamic discrete-choice model of automobile replacement. Results show that 65% of the households would replace their vehicles even without the subsidy. To highlight the impact of subsidy design, I show that limiting the subsidies to low-income consumers would generate 85% of the sales with half amount of total government spending. These findings emphasize the importance of balancing policy stimulus with government spending and targeting consumers more efficiently in the design of subsidy programs.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2023
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Automotive engineering. $3 2181195
653 $a Empirical industrial organization
653 $a Auctions
653 $a Consumer demand
653 $a Automobile replacement
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 lcsh $3 542853
690 $a 0540
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 783688
710 2 $a Northwestern University. $b Economics. $3 1020895
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-11B.
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29166734 $z click for full text (PQDT)