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"Now We Must" : = How the U.S. Learned from Strategic Failure and Managed the Consequences of Institutional Decay During Its Withdrawal from the Vietnam War, 1968-1972.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	"Now We Must" :/
Reminder of title:	How the U.S. Learned from Strategic Failure and Managed the Consequences of Institutional Decay During Its Withdrawal from the Vietnam War, 1968-1972.
Author:	Alessi-Friedlander, R. Z.
Description:	1 online resource (126 pages)
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International83-11.
Subject:	Military history. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29067938click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798802723258

"Now We Must" : = How the U.S. Learned from Strategic Failure and Managed the Consequences of Institutional Decay During Its Withdrawal from the Vietnam War, 1968-1972.
Alessi-Friedlander, R. Z.

"Now We Must" :How the U.S. Learned from Strategic Failure and Managed the Consequences of Institutional Decay During Its Withdrawal from the Vietnam War, 1968-1972. - 1 online resource (126 pages)

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11.

Thesis (M.A.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2022.

Includes bibliographical references

The subject of this thesis is the late-Vietnam Army (1968-1972), and my purpose is to examine how a military service grappled with the dual challenges of strategic and institutional failure amidst the converging social, economic, and political changes of the late Cold War. I argue that the Army's leaders titled backward and inward to shift the institution forward and outward in order to prepare it for a vision of future warfare it preferred: mid-intensity conflict along the inter-German border. The Army's leaders learned selective lessons from a conflict it would neither seek nor promote again while managing its deleterious consequences. Institutional culture acted as a drag factor throughout the Army's extended withdrawal from southeast Asia. This thesis uses primary-source documentation from the official papers and oral histories of the U.S. Army's senior leaders, the institution's top-level studies, and the "gray literature" from an emergent generation of officers.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2023

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798802723258Subjects--Topical Terms:

552332
Military history.
Subjects--Index Terms:

1970sIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

"Now We Must" : = How the U.S. Learned from Strategic Failure and Managed the Consequences of Institutional Decay During Its Withdrawal from the Vietnam War, 1968-1972.
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100 1 $a Alessi-Friedlander, R. Z. $3 3693469
245 1 0 $a "Now We Must" : $b How the U.S. Learned from Strategic Failure and Managed the Consequences of Institutional Decay During Its Withdrawal from the Vietnam War, 1968-1972.
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500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11.
500 $a Advisor: Lee, Wayne E.;Morgan, Michael C.
502 $a Thesis (M.A.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2022.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a The subject of this thesis is the late-Vietnam Army (1968-1972), and my purpose is to examine how a military service grappled with the dual challenges of strategic and institutional failure amidst the converging social, economic, and political changes of the late Cold War. I argue that the Army's leaders titled backward and inward to shift the institution forward and outward in order to prepare it for a vision of future warfare it preferred: mid-intensity conflict along the inter-German border. The Army's leaders learned selective lessons from a conflict it would neither seek nor promote again while managing its deleterious consequences. Institutional culture acted as a drag factor throughout the Army's extended withdrawal from southeast Asia. This thesis uses primary-source documentation from the official papers and oral histories of the U.S. Army's senior leaders, the institution's top-level studies, and the "gray literature" from an emergent generation of officers.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2023
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Military history. $3 552332
653 $a 1970s
653 $a Institutional culture
653 $a Modernization
653 $a U.S. Army
653 $a Vietnam
653 $a Westmoreland, William C.
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 lcsh $3 542853
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710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 783688
710 2 $a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. $b History. $3 1020236
773 0 $t Masters Abstracts International $g 83-11.
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29067938 $z click for full text (PQDT)