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Essays on Financial Reporting Incentives and Bank Transparency.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Financial Reporting Incentives and Bank Transparency./
作者:	Rudolf, Nicolas.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	156 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-05A.
標題:	Decision making. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28732645
ISBN:	9798544226031

Essays on Financial Reporting Incentives and Bank Transparency.
Rudolf, Nicolas.

Essays on Financial Reporting Incentives and Bank Transparency. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 156 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Universitaet Mannheim (Germany), 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The global financial crisis placed bank transparency in the limelight of public interest (Financial Times, 2010). A major source of bank transparency is banks' financial reporting that helps to inform depositors, regulators, supervisors, and capital market participants about banks' financial position, performance, business activities, and in particular risk-taking (Bushman and Williams, 2015; Freixas and Laux, 2012). However, accounting information from financial statements is only a noisy representation of the underlying economic reality as the rules that govern the reported numbers often require the exercise of judgement (Bushman, 2016).The discretion inherent to accounting standards has two faces (Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Yang, 2004). On the one hand, accounting discretion can increase transparency by allowing managers to convey private information to outsiders when having superior knowledge about a transaction that can otherwise not be reflected in the accounting system (e.g., Beaver, Eger, Ryan and Wolfson, 1989; Wahlen, 1994). On the other hand, managerial discretion can also lead to the opportunistic application of accounting rules driven by reporting incentives that, in turn, undermine bank transparency (e.g., Vyas, 2011; Bischof, Laux, and Leuz, 2020).One major accounting choice in the banking industry that involves substantial managerial discretion is the accounting for loan losses (Liu and Ryan, 2006; Barth and Landsman, 2010; Beatty and Liao, 2014; Gebhard and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). Loans are economically important for banks as they are the largest asset on most banks' balance sheets and loan loss provisions represent the largest bank accrual for the majority of banks (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Acharya and Ryan, 2015).During and after the global financial crisis (2007-2008) the accounting rules for loan loss provisions were frequently blamed for encouraging banks to recognize delayed and insufficient provisions as cushions against future loan losses (Dugan, 2009; Curry, 2013). 2 This critique ultimately resulted in the introduction of redesigned and more forward-looking provisioning standards in Europe (IFRS 9) and the United States (ASU 2016-13).However, banks' reporting choices can be influenced by a variety of incentives and pressures that go far beyond the design of accounting standards per se (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Bushman, 2014). Bank-specific incentives such as capital market pressure, private ownership, taxation, or regulation are associated with discretion in recognizing loan losses (e.g., Beatty et al., 1995, 2002; Collins et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Bushman and Williams, 2012). Furthermore, individual manager incentives and preferences that are correlated with risk-taking, capital structure, and corporate reporting choices in general could play a significant role for banks' provisioning behavior (Armstrong et al., 2010; Bamber et al., 2010; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Ge et al., 2011).Besides the discretion that arises from accounting standards or individual manager preferences, the institutional design and in particular enforcement can influence firms' reporting behavior (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, 2013; Holthausen, 2009). In the banking sector, dedicated bank supervisors tend to dominate the public enforcement of reporting regulation (Bischof, Daske, Elfers, and Hail, 2020)However, the supervisory and regulatory toolkit is not limited to direct enforcement by intervention into banks' business activities through penalties and other corrective actions.

ISBN: 9798544226031Subjects--Topical Terms:

517204
Decision making.

Essays on Financial Reporting Incentives and Bank Transparency.
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