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Essays on Optimal Behavior in Centra...

Khanna, Gourika.

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Essays on Optimal Behavior in Centralized Markets.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Optimal Behavior in Centralized Markets./
Author:	Khanna, Gourika.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
Description:	99 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-03B.
Subject:	Farmers. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28841657
ISBN:	9798460447459

Essays on Optimal Behavior in Centralized Markets.
Khanna, Gourika.

Essays on Optimal Behavior in Centralized Markets. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 99 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In chapter two, I argue that intermediaries' market power plays an essential role in contributing to farmers' low income. I show that a source of their market power is intermediaries' heterogeneous capacity to buy produce. As intermediaries start purchasing farmers' output in a market, traders with small capacity exit the market upon filling up their quota, leaving the large intermediaries to continue to negotiate in the market. With fewer traders in the market, these large intermediaries exert monopsony power to pay farmers a low price. Using transaction-level data from intermediaries' books, I present patterns that suggest the presence and source of market power. I further develop a dynamic model of competition and bargaining to capture the dynamics of the market structure. Using the structural model, I simulate the impact of removing the heterogeneity across intermediaries would improve competition among them. According to the estimates, the average price paid to the farmer increases by 4.4%. Small landholding farmers make up 80% of India's agriculture community. Chapter three studies how credit constraints in agricultural markets impact small landholders differently than farmers with large land. Using administrative data, I show that delayed harvest receives a higher price. A characteristic of agricultural credit is that farmers borrow against their land. For the same amount of land, the interest rate rises with the amount borrowed. The decision of the farmer to harvest their crop depends on what price he can get in the market and the interest rate charged on his loan. Trade-off a farmer faces is delaying his harvest or getting a higher price. I develop a single agent decision problem, where the farmer chooses when to harvest his crop, how much to borrow, and the amount to consume in every period. Using the model, I show that a higher borrowing rate leads farmers to borrow less, harvest their crops sooner, and consume less per period. Higher borrowing rates reduce farmers' utility and this decrease is more significant for the large farmers than the smaller farmers. With the growth in online platforms, the focus now is to discuss the welfare of the third-party sellers that use these platforms to conduct their business. Chapter four quantifies the cost of demand uncertainty on the third-party marketplace sellers. To understand the demand uncertainty, I study short-term deals offered by Amazon, in which the seller who applies to be on the deal selects his inventory before learning whether he will be on the deal or not. If the seller is rejected to be on the deal he reduces his price to decrease his inventory stock. Using scrapped data from the website's search pages, I confirm that sellers eligible to apply for the deal reduce the price they charge in the face of demand uncertainty. I develop a structural model, where a seller decides if he wants to apply for the deal and how much inventory to stock. Using the estimated model, I show that if the platform removes the uncertainty from the sellers (i.e., the seller knows whether he is on the deal or not before making the inventory decision), then the surplus that accrues to the platform falls by 27.7%. Whereas the surplus for consumers and sellers increased by 19.6% and 23.3%, respectively.

ISBN: 9798460447459Subjects--Topical Terms:

570534
Farmers.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Agricultural output

Essays on Optimal Behavior in Centralized Markets.
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300 $a 99 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: Tybout, James.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a In chapter two, I argue that intermediaries' market power plays an essential role in contributing to farmers' low income. I show that a source of their market power is intermediaries' heterogeneous capacity to buy produce. As intermediaries start purchasing farmers' output in a market, traders with small capacity exit the market upon filling up their quota, leaving the large intermediaries to continue to negotiate in the market. With fewer traders in the market, these large intermediaries exert monopsony power to pay farmers a low price. Using transaction-level data from intermediaries' books, I present patterns that suggest the presence and source of market power. I further develop a dynamic model of competition and bargaining to capture the dynamics of the market structure. Using the structural model, I simulate the impact of removing the heterogeneity across intermediaries would improve competition among them. According to the estimates, the average price paid to the farmer increases by 4.4%. Small landholding farmers make up 80% of India's agriculture community. Chapter three studies how credit constraints in agricultural markets impact small landholders differently than farmers with large land. Using administrative data, I show that delayed harvest receives a higher price. A characteristic of agricultural credit is that farmers borrow against their land. For the same amount of land, the interest rate rises with the amount borrowed. The decision of the farmer to harvest their crop depends on what price he can get in the market and the interest rate charged on his loan. Trade-off a farmer faces is delaying his harvest or getting a higher price. I develop a single agent decision problem, where the farmer chooses when to harvest his crop, how much to borrow, and the amount to consume in every period. Using the model, I show that a higher borrowing rate leads farmers to borrow less, harvest their crops sooner, and consume less per period. Higher borrowing rates reduce farmers' utility and this decrease is more significant for the large farmers than the smaller farmers. With the growth in online platforms, the focus now is to discuss the welfare of the third-party sellers that use these platforms to conduct their business. Chapter four quantifies the cost of demand uncertainty on the third-party marketplace sellers. To understand the demand uncertainty, I study short-term deals offered by Amazon, in which the seller who applies to be on the deal selects his inventory before learning whether he will be on the deal or not. If the seller is rejected to be on the deal he reduces his price to decrease his inventory stock. Using scrapped data from the website's search pages, I confirm that sellers eligible to apply for the deal reduce the price they charge in the face of demand uncertainty. I develop a structural model, where a seller decides if he wants to apply for the deal and how much inventory to stock. Using the estimated model, I show that if the platform removes the uncertainty from the sellers (i.e., the seller knows whether he is on the deal or not before making the inventory decision), then the surplus that accrues to the platform falls by 27.7%. Whereas the surplus for consumers and sellers increased by 19.6% and 23.3%, respectively.
590 $a School code: 0176.
650 4 $a Farmers. $3 570534
650 4 $a Rice. $3 649844
650 4 $a Prices. $3 652651
650 4 $a Harvest. $3 3559359
650 4 $a Competition. $3 537031
650 4 $a Agriculture. $3 518588
653 $a Agricultural output
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690 $a 0503
710 2 $a The Pennsylvania State University. $3 699896
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-03B.
790 $a 0176
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28841657