東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Who Makes the Decision? Managerial I...

Hightower, Sonja.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Who Makes the Decision? Managerial Influence on Corporate Boards and Auditor Selection, Change, and Compensation.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Who Makes the Decision? Managerial Influence on Corporate Boards and Auditor Selection, Change, and Compensation./
作者:	Hightower, Sonja.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	111 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02A.
標題:	Business administration. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28674409
ISBN:	9798516992148

Who Makes the Decision? Managerial Influence on Corporate Boards and Auditor Selection, Change, and Compensation.
Hightower, Sonja.

Who Makes the Decision? Managerial Influence on Corporate Boards and Auditor Selection, Change, and Compensation. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 111 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of North Texas, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation examines whether managers influence corporate boards of directors in their auditor selection, change, and compensation decisions. This topic is important because it addresses concerns that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is not effective in eliminating managerial influence over auditor engagement decisions and that it may provide a false sense of security to investors. These concerns are based on the implicit assumption that managers prefer weaker governance oversight and lower audit quality. However, empirical research testing associations between managerial influence and audit-related decisions post-SOX is scarce and generally guided by agency theory. Incorporating agency, stewardship, and resource dependence perspectives, I find that managerial preferences for auditor selection are not aligned. Specifically, CEOs positively influence the selection of higher quality auditors, whereas CFOs have the opposite effect. Further, CEOs who hold powerful roles as chairs of their companies' boards of directors appear to mitigate the negative influence of CFOs and inside directors on audit quality. CEOs serving in dual roles also oppose auditor turnover when lower earnings quality prompt higher demand for audit effort. Finally, my study provides some evidence that management exercises downward pressures on audit fees, suggesting that managers utilize their authority beyond the regulations established by SOX to negotiate auditor compensation.

ISBN: 9798516992148Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168311
Business administration.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Auditor selection

Who Makes the Decision? Managerial Influence on Corporate Boards and Auditor Selection, Change, and Compensation.
LDR:02973nmm a2200457 4500 001 2284640
005 20211123073405.5
008 220723s2020 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798516992148
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28674409
035 $a (MiAaPQ)0158vireo2115Hightower
035 $a AAI28674409
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Hightower, Sonja. $3 3563824
245 1 0 $a Who Makes the Decision? Managerial Influence on Corporate Boards and Auditor Selection, Change, and Compensation.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2020
300 $a 111 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Seetharaman, Ananth.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of North Texas, 2020.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a This dissertation examines whether managers influence corporate boards of directors in their auditor selection, change, and compensation decisions. This topic is important because it addresses concerns that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is not effective in eliminating managerial influence over auditor engagement decisions and that it may provide a false sense of security to investors. These concerns are based on the implicit assumption that managers prefer weaker governance oversight and lower audit quality. However, empirical research testing associations between managerial influence and audit-related decisions post-SOX is scarce and generally guided by agency theory. Incorporating agency, stewardship, and resource dependence perspectives, I find that managerial preferences for auditor selection are not aligned. Specifically, CEOs positively influence the selection of higher quality auditors, whereas CFOs have the opposite effect. Further, CEOs who hold powerful roles as chairs of their companies' boards of directors appear to mitigate the negative influence of CFOs and inside directors on audit quality. CEOs serving in dual roles also oppose auditor turnover when lower earnings quality prompt higher demand for audit effort. Finally, my study provides some evidence that management exercises downward pressures on audit fees, suggesting that managers utilize their authority beyond the regulations established by SOX to negotiate auditor compensation.
590 $a School code: 0158.
650 4 $a Business administration. $3 3168311
650 4 $a Decision making. $3 517204
650 4 $a Regulatory reform. $3 3561706
653 $a Auditor selection
653 $a Auditor compensation
653 $a Audit quality
653 $a Managerial influence
653 $a Corporate governance
653 $a Agency theory
653 $a Stewardship theory
653 $a Resource dependence theory
690 $a 0272
690 $a 0310
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0703
710 2 $a University of North Texas. $b Department of Accounting. $3 3563825
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-02A.
790 $a 0158
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2020
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28674409