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Moral Structures: Scientific Reflect...

Jebari, Joseph D.

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Moral Structures: Scientific Reflections on Rationalist Themes.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Moral Structures: Scientific Reflections on Rationalist Themes./
Author:	Jebari, Joseph D.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
Description:	214 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-12A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28494942
ISBN:	9798516924705

Moral Structures: Scientific Reflections on Rationalist Themes.
Jebari, Joseph D.

Moral Structures: Scientific Reflections on Rationalist Themes. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 214 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In this dissertation, I develop a substantive, scientific account of the nature of practical normativity and then use this account to articulate an empirically tractable version of the rationalist approach to ethics. In Chapter One, I consider the basis of the longstanding problem of naturalizing practical normativity. I locate the source of this problem in a specific, pre-theoretic conception of action explanation, which reflects our justificatory practices of "explaining ourselves" to others. Given this, I argue that this problem will only have force insofar as the scientific explanation of action is also required to model these practices. Then, in Chapter Two, I demonstrate the significance of an alternative, pre-theoretic conception of action explanation-which I call normative action explanation-that takes as its paradigm the explanation of non-human action. The distinguishing feature of normative action explanation is that it works by citing an organism's normative reasons for action rather than its motivating reasons for acting. I then develop an analysis of an organism's normative reasons for action that grounds such reasons in the activity of living as that particular organism.In Chapter Three, I show that the optimality approach in behavioral ecology provides the resources needed to evaluate normative action explanations empirically and that an adequate account of the resulting optimality explanations must ground such explanations in the theory of biological autonomy-the leading scientific theory of the nature of life. I conclude that normative action explanations are equivalent in both structure and interpretation to optimality explanations, meaning that the latter is sufficient to integrate the former into the natural sciences. Finally, in Chapter Four, I show that, when this framework is applied to the human case, it makes available an empirically tractable version of the rationalist approach to ethics. On this view, moral and normative requirements derive their content and authority from our position in and dependence on the social systems of which we are a part. The result, I argue, is a rationalist characterization of moral and normative requirements that grounds such requirements in empirically evaluable facts about the relational structure of human social systems.

ISBN: 9798516924705Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Action theory

Moral Structures: Scientific Reflections on Rationalist Themes.
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520 $a In this dissertation, I develop a substantive, scientific account of the nature of practical normativity and then use this account to articulate an empirically tractable version of the rationalist approach to ethics. In Chapter One, I consider the basis of the longstanding problem of naturalizing practical normativity. I locate the source of this problem in a specific, pre-theoretic conception of action explanation, which reflects our justificatory practices of "explaining ourselves" to others. Given this, I argue that this problem will only have force insofar as the scientific explanation of action is also required to model these practices. Then, in Chapter Two, I demonstrate the significance of an alternative, pre-theoretic conception of action explanation-which I call normative action explanation-that takes as its paradigm the explanation of non-human action. The distinguishing feature of normative action explanation is that it works by citing an organism's normative reasons for action rather than its motivating reasons for acting. I then develop an analysis of an organism's normative reasons for action that grounds such reasons in the activity of living as that particular organism.In Chapter Three, I show that the optimality approach in behavioral ecology provides the resources needed to evaluate normative action explanations empirically and that an adequate account of the resulting optimality explanations must ground such explanations in the theory of biological autonomy-the leading scientific theory of the nature of life. I conclude that normative action explanations are equivalent in both structure and interpretation to optimality explanations, meaning that the latter is sufficient to integrate the former into the natural sciences. Finally, in Chapter Four, I show that, when this framework is applied to the human case, it makes available an empirically tractable version of the rationalist approach to ethics. On this view, moral and normative requirements derive their content and authority from our position in and dependence on the social systems of which we are a part. The result, I argue, is a rationalist characterization of moral and normative requirements that grounds such requirements in empirically evaluable facts about the relational structure of human social systems.
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