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Knowledge by Constraint.

Holguin, Ben.

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Knowledge by Constraint.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Knowledge by Constraint./
作者:	Holguin, Ben.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	226 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-05A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=22616541
ISBN:	9781392850015

Knowledge by Constraint.
Holguin, Ben.

Knowledge by Constraint. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 226 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-05, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation is about knowledge and its role in our cognitive lives. It defends contextualist, question-sensitive accounts of knowledge and belief and uses them to answer a number of difficult questions at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of language. These include such questions as: Why do we sometimes speak as if the standards for knowing are extremely high, but other times as if they require little more than an (accurate) educated guess? What's the relationship between 'believe', belief, and credence? Under what conditions should one's assertions be conditional rather than categorical? And what's the difference between lying and merely speaking falsely? A recurring theme throughout the chapters is that the concept of knowledge has a starring role in answering many descriptive questions about the mind (i.e., questions about how we actually think and talk), but a marginal role in answering normative questions about it (i.e., questions about how we ought to think and talk).

ISBN: 9781392850015Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Belief

Knowledge by Constraint.
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