東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Deposit Insurance, Bank Risk Managem...

He, Rui.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Deposit Insurance, Bank Risk Management and Credit Source Choices.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Deposit Insurance, Bank Risk Management and Credit Source Choices./
Author:	He, Rui.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
Description:	85 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-10, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-10A.
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27786779
ISBN:	9781392383926

Deposit Insurance, Bank Risk Management and Credit Source Choices.
He, Rui.

Deposit Insurance, Bank Risk Management and Credit Source Choices. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 85 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-10, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This paper explored two moral hazard phenomena which may lead to bank run and financial crisis. These phenomena are caused by the limited liability of banks on their debts. The first phenomenon is the overly high leverages on bank balance sheets due to the fact that explicit or implicit deposit insurance makes debt cheaper for banks. With deposit insurance, banks take less equity and more debt. Also, they make more investments than the socially optimal levels. The second moral hazard phenomena is excessive risk taking in the choices of investment projects. It turns out that, even monitored by the debtors with partial information, banks still tend to make investment riskier than what is good for the society. Volcker Rule and other mandatory risk management requirements are well justified by this finding. Further, discount window stigma associated with secondary credit line is modeled by a debt-rollover game with credit source differentiation mechanism. The result shows that, the division between primary and secondary credit lines introduced by Regulation A strictly improves the social welfare.

ISBN: 9781392383926Subjects--Index Terms:

Moral hazard phenomena

Deposit Insurance, Bank Risk Management and Credit Source Choices.
LDR:02145nmm a2200313 4500 001 2279385
005 20210817110125.5
008 220723s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781392383926
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI27786779
035 $a (MiAaPQ)US_Calif_149980
035 $a AAI27786779
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a He, Rui. $3 1923254
245 1 0 $a Deposit Insurance, Bank Risk Management and Credit Source Choices.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2019
300 $a 85 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-10, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Magill, Michael.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2019.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This paper explored two moral hazard phenomena which may lead to bank run and financial crisis. These phenomena are caused by the limited liability of banks on their debts. The first phenomenon is the overly high leverages on bank balance sheets due to the fact that explicit or implicit deposit insurance makes debt cheaper for banks. With deposit insurance, banks take less equity and more debt. Also, they make more investments than the socially optimal levels. The second moral hazard phenomena is excessive risk taking in the choices of investment projects. It turns out that, even monitored by the debtors with partial information, banks still tend to make investment riskier than what is good for the society. Volcker Rule and other mandatory risk management requirements are well justified by this finding. Further, discount window stigma associated with secondary credit line is modeled by a debt-rollover game with credit source differentiation mechanism. The result shows that, the division between primary and secondary credit lines introduced by Regulation A strictly improves the social welfare.
590 $a School code: 0208.
653 $a Moral hazard phenomena
690 $a 0770
710 2 $a University of Southern California. $3 700129
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 81-10A.
790 $a 0208
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2019
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27786779